Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
cross_type 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts
Lackey is a prominent philosopher who has extensively contributed to the epistemology of testimony, specifically by analyzing the transmission of knowledge and defeaters [1], critiquing conditions of testimony [2], and being categorized as a key figure in the non-direct view of testimony [3]. Additionally, Lackey has served as an editor for academic collections focused on the subject of testimony [4].
Facts (4)
Sources
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
claimPeter Graham (2006) categorizes philosophers who support a non-direct view of testimony as including Adler (2002), Audi (1997, 2002, 2004, 2006), Hume (1739), Kusch (2002), Lackey (2003, 2006), Lehrer (1994), Lyons (1997), Faulkner (2000), Fricker (1987, 1994, 1995, 2002, 2006a), and Root (1998, 2001).
claimLackey (1999) identifies cases where a speaker reliably passes information to a hearer even when the speaker does not know the proposition due to personal or warranted doubts, demonstrating that the speaker's defeaters are not necessarily transmitted to the hearer.
referenceElizabeth Fricker published 'Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy' in the 2006 collection edited by Lackey and Sosa.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimE. Fricker (1995) and Lackey (2008) object to Coady's condition T1, arguing that one can testify that p even if the testimony provides the hearer with no evidence that p is true, such as when a speaker is known to be unreliable.