entity

Lackey

Also known as: Jennifer Lackey

Facts (13)

Sources
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 6 facts
claimPeter Graham (2006) categorizes philosophers who support a non-direct view of testimony as including Adler (2002), Audi (1997, 2002, 2004, 2006), Hume (1739), Kusch (2002), Lackey (2003, 2006), Lehrer (1994), Lyons (1997), Faulkner (2000), Fricker (1987, 1994, 1995, 2002, 2006a), and Root (1998, 2001).
referenceSanford Goldberg published 'Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge' in the 2006 collection edited by Lackey and Sosa.
claimLackey (1999) identifies cases where a speaker reliably passes information to a hearer even when the speaker does not know the proposition due to personal or warranted doubts, demonstrating that the speaker's defeaters are not necessarily transmitted to the hearer.
referenceThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy categorizes epistemological views on testimony based on conditions for the testifier (T-side) and the recipient (S-side), identifying four categories: Reductionism (demanding on both sides), Anti-Reductionism (demanding on T-side, less demanding on S-side), and other variations involving thinkers such as Audi, Fricker, Lackey, Burge, Plantinga, Ross, Welbourne, Goldberg, Graham, and Green.
claimFaulkner and Lackey argue that human freedom is a factor that distinguishes perceptually-based beliefs from testimonially-based beliefs.
referenceElizabeth Fricker published 'Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy' in the 2006 collection edited by Lackey and Sosa.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Feb 26, 2001 3 facts
claimScholars including Medina (2011), Mason (2011), Anderson (2012), Davis (2016), Lackey (2018), and Maitra (2018) have sought to amend or qualify Miranda Fricker's definitions of epistemic injustice.
claimLackey (2021) argues that joint commitment accounts of group belief fail to recognize that there can be various reasons for joint commitment that do not reflect actual group belief.
claimLackey (2016) argues that Schmitt's requirement for group justification—that every member must have a justified belief to the same effect—makes group justification too difficult to achieve.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Apr 1, 2021 3 facts
claimOpponents of hybrid views of testimonial justification, including Insole (2000), Weiner (2003), and Lackey (2008), argue that these accounts either suffer from the same objections as standard Reductionism and Non-Reductionism or introduce new problems.
claimLackey (2008) offers a disjunctive account of testimony that distinguishes between speaker testimony and hearer testimony.
claimE. Fricker (1995) and Lackey (2008) object to Coady's condition T1, arguing that one can testify that p even if the testimony provides the hearer with no evidence that p is true, such as when a speaker is known to be unreliable.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community William D. Rowley · Rebus Community 1 fact
claimDefenders of the steadfast view in the epistemology of disagreement include Kelly (2005), Kelly (2010), Lackey (2010), and Huemer (2011).