Relations (1)

cross_type 2.00 — strongly supporting 3 facts

Ludwig Wittgenstein explored the nature of the [concept] 'self' by characterizing it as an invisible perspectival point {fact:1, fact:2} and questioning the possibility of conscious awareness regarding it [1].

Facts (3)

Sources
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2 facts
referenceSaul Kripke (1982) notes that Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds relies on the claim that there is no conscious awareness of the self.
claimLudwig Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, likened the self to the eye that sees but cannot see itself.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact
claimLudwig Wittgenstein (1921) suggested that the self serves as the perspectival point from which the world of objects is present to experience.