Ludwig Wittgenstein
Facts (16)
Sources
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 11 facts
referenceSaul Kripke (1982) notes that Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds relies on the claim that there is no conscious awareness of the self.
referenceLudwig Wittgenstein authored the book 'The Blue and Brown Books', published in 1958 by Blackwell in Oxford.
referenceLudwig Wittgenstein authored the book 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', originally published in 1921, with a 1961 translation by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness published by Routledge & Kegan Paul in London.
claimLudwig Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, likened the self to the eye that sees but cannot see itself.
referenceLudwig Wittgenstein authored the book 'Philosophical Investigations', published in 1953 with a translation by G.E.M. Anscombe by Blackwell in Oxford.
claimEpistemic security, the philosophical position that one cannot be mistaken about whether one is in a certain mental state, is distinct from the immunity to error through misidentification described by Ludwig Wittgenstein.
claimIn 'The Blue and Brown Books', Ludwig Wittgenstein distinguishes between two uses of the term 'I': the 'use as subject' and the 'use as object'.
referencePeter Sullivan discussed solipsism and Ludwig Wittgenstein's rejection of the a priori in his 1996 article 'The ‘Truth’ in Solipsism, and Wittgenstein’s Rejection of the A Priori' published in the European Journal of Philosophy.
claimLudwig Wittgenstein illustrates that when 'I' is used as an object, one can make an error of misidentification, such as mistakenly judging 'I have a broken arm' when seeing another person's broken arm in a tangle of bodies.
claimLudwig Wittgenstein suggests that the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) is responsible for the mistaken opinion that the use of 'I' as a subject refers to an immaterial soul. Wittgenstein argues that self-ascriptions of psychological predicates do not rely on an identification of a bodily or non-bodily entity, but rather rely on no identification at all.
claimLudwig Wittgenstein argues that when one judges 'I have a pain' based on feeling pain, it makes no sense to wonder whether the pain is one's own, meaning self-ascriptions of pain based on introspective grounds are immune to errors of misidentification.
Epistemology - Belief, Justification, Rationality | Britannica britannica.com Mar 13, 2026 2 facts
referenceIn the work "On Certainty," Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that knowledge and certitude are radically different concepts and that neither concept entails the other.
perspectiveLudwig Wittgenstein identified certainty not with apprehension or "seeing," but with a kind of acting, where a proposition is certain when its truth is presupposed in the various social activities of a community.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimOrdinary language philosophy, as practiced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, attempts to derive epistemological insights from the analysis of how ordinary language is used.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 1 fact
claimLudwig Wittgenstein (1921) suggested that the self serves as the perspectival point from which the world of objects is present to experience.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 1 fact
claimThe rule-following problem, raised by Ludwig Wittgenstein, posits that any sequence of items (such as '1, 3, 5, 7...') is compatible with multiple different rules, making it impossible to infer the specific rule being followed based solely on the output.