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The relationship between the self and introspection is defined by the philosophical debate over whether introspection can reveal the self as an object of awareness, as seen in the 'elusiveness thesis' [1] and the arguments of philosophers like David Hume [2] and Sydney Shoemaker [3].
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Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 5 facts
claimA common philosophical supposition is that self-consciousness is fundamentally a conscious awareness of the self, where introspection reveals a thing presented as oneself.
claimDavid Hume rejected the idea that introspection reveals the self, claiming that when he introspected, he could never catch himself, but only perceptions.
claimSydney Shoemaker (1984b, 1986) argues that if there is an introspective awareness of the self as an object, it should be understood as a form of self-perception, but he also contends that introspection is not a form of perception, meaning we do not introspectively perceive the self.
claimA common argument for introspective self-awareness is that in introspection, one is perceptually aware of one's own mental properties, and perceiving a property implies perceiving that which has that property (the self).
claimP.F. Strawson (1966), Evans (1982), Sutton Morris (1982), Ayers (1991), Brewer (1995), Cassam (1995, 1997), and Bermúdez (1998, 2011) maintain that even if introspection does not reveal the self as an object, bodily awareness is a form of perceptual experience that does reveal the self.
Self-Consciousness - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu 1 fact
referenceThe 'elusiveness thesis' is the philosophical view that introspection never provides the self as an object of awareness; instead, individuals only encounter thoughts, emotions, sensations, and other psychological events.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimGeorge Berkeley's concept of 'notion' can be interpreted either as implying that the self contains more than introspection can capture, or that notions capture the self as totally as ideas capture their objects.