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cross_type 13.00 — strongly supporting 13 facts
David Chalmers is a central philosopher who extensively theorizes about phenomenal properties, specifically defining them in contrast to physical properties [1], exploring their role in Russellian monism [2], and analyzing their irreducibility and structural nature {fact:9, fact:10, fact:13}.
Facts (13)
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The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 9 facts
quoteDavid Chalmers defines protophenomenal properties as "special properties that are not themselves phenomenal (there is nothing it is like to have them) but that can collectively constitute phenomenal properties."
claimDavid Chalmers rejects his earlier interpretation of phenomenal properties as information structure because it is difficult to see how they are metaphysically necessary rather than brute nomic principles.
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that the intrinsic properties of the physical world are themselves phenomenal properties, an interpretation derived from the relationship between percepts and intrinsic essence in Russellian Monism.
claimIf David Chalmers's interpretation of Russellian monism is true, a modal argument based on the supposition of a parallel world that is physically identical to ours but lacks phenomenal properties would lose its logical basis, as such a world would be logically impossible.
claimDavid Chalmers relates 'property dualism' to both the phenomenal and physical properties of an individual, and to emergent ontic properties of an underlying, more fundamental ontic substance.
claimDavid Chalmers does not consider a priori entailment between phenomenal and physical properties to be a necessary requirement for his theory of consciousness, preferring instead to rely on a contingent principle to explain the relationship.
claimDavid Chalmers defines the physical as properties that can be sufficiently described from a third-person perspective, in contrast to phenomenal properties which can only be described from a first-person view.
claimDavid Chalmers's identification of phenomenal properties with the intrinsic essence or quiddities of relata is not logically necessary, as there may be other candidates for intrinsic essence that are currently unknown.
claimDavid Chalmers transforms the epistemological explanatory gap into an ontological gap between physical and phenomenal properties by arguing for the necessity of additional ontic categories.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers asserts that phenomenal properties exist beyond formal properties, and these properties distinguish the phenomenal realization of information from its physical realization.
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that the core of phenomenal irreducibility might lie in the fact that some phenomenal properties, such as hue properties, lack structural expression.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers leans toward the view that the irreducibility of consciousness lies in the independence of phenomenal structure from the physical domain and the intrinsic nature of phenomenal properties, which contrasts with the relational nature of physical concepts.
claimDavid Chalmers notes that the structural properties of experience, such as the geometry of a visual field, are more amenable to physical explanation than other phenomenal properties, yet still require a nonreductive principle to bridge the explanatory gap.