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Consciousness and phenomenal properties are intrinsically linked in philosophy of mind, where phenomenal properties are defined as the qualitative aspects of consciousness [1] [2]. Various theories, such as dual-aspect monism [3] [4] and non-reductive naturalism [5], explore how these properties relate to the existence and nature of consciousness, often debating whether they are reducible to physical states [6] [7] [8].
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The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 3 facts
claimThe arguments regarding the irreducibility of consciousness postulate an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal accounts, implying an ontological distinction between phenomenal and physical properties.
claimA non-reductive naturalistic theory of consciousness may propose natural supervenience of phenomenal properties on physical properties, provided it incorporates additional natural principles not found in physical law.
claimRussellian monism is not affected by the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument, and it supports a naturalist view on consciousness while integrating phenomenal and physical properties.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
claimProtophenomenal properties are defined as properties that in certain combinations transparently account for the existence of consciousness, meaning one could in principle move a priori from knowing facts about protophenomenal properties to knowing facts about phenomenal properties.
referencePaul Coates and Sarn Coleman edited 'Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness', published by Oxford University Press in 2015.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
perspectiveElizabeth Irvine argues that phenomenal properties (properties of consciousness) do not exist in our common-sense view of the world.
quoteWolfgang Fasching stated: 'Today there is a strong tendency to simply equate consciousness with the qualia. Yet there is clearly something not quite right about this. The "itchiness of itches" and the "hurtfulness of pain" are qualities we are conscious of. So philosophy of mind tends to treat consciousness as if it consisted simply of the contents of consciousness (the phenomenal qualities), while it really is precisely consciousness of contents, the very givenness of whatever is subjectively given. And therefore the problem of consciousness does not pertain so much to some alleged "mysterious, nonpublic objects", i.e. objects that seem to be only "visible" to the respective subject, but rather to the nature of "seeing" itself (and in today's philosophy of mind astonishingly little is said about the latter).'
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 2 facts
claimA dual-aspect view of consciousness holds that there is one basic underlying substance that possesses both physical and phenomenal properties.
claimA dualist view of consciousness exists that rejects the causal closure of physics while maintaining concordance with basic physical theory by assigning phenomenal properties the role of collapsing the wave function through observation.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
perspectiveNelkin (1989) and Rosenthal (1991) challenge the view that the functional and motivational roles of conscious affective states, such as pleasures and pains, are intrinsic to their experiential character and inseparable from their qualitative and phenomenal properties.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 1 fact
perspectiveDual-aspect monists argue that consciousness and its phenomenal qualities are intrinsic because they are known in themselves, beyond their relations to causes, effects, or other things.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimA more precise definition of protophenomenal properties is that they are properties which, in certain combinations, transparently account for the existence of consciousness, meaning one could in principle deduce phenomenal properties from knowledge of protophenomenal properties (Chalmers 2015; Goff 2015, 2017).