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• The arguments regarding the irreducibility of consciousness postulate an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal accounts, implying an ontological distinction between phenomenal and physical properties.
• Physical properties have realizers that possess phenomenal or protophenomenal properties.
• A non-reductive naturalistic theory of consciousness may propose natural supervenience of phenomenal properties on physical properties, provided it incorporates additional natural principles not found in physical law.
• The author of the text argues that the 'hard problem' of consciousness is largely a problem of definition, as 'functional' can be defined in various ways and is not the only way to distinguish between physical and phenomenal properties.
• Phenomenal properties of consciousness might represent a separate ontic category obeying 'psychophysical principles' that differ from those governing physical properties, while specifying how phenomenal or protophenomenal properties depend on physical properties.
• Non-reductive physicalism, as described by Donald Davidson in 1980, asserts that phenomenal properties are not identical to physical properties, but that specific instances of phenomenal properties are fully constituted by instances of physical properties.
• In a dual-aspect view, phenomenal properties are not reducible to physical properties, and the instantiation of these properties may depend on the configuration of the basic substance (e.g., a brain vs. a table).
• David Chalmers relates 'property dualism' to both the phenomenal and physical properties of an individual, and to emergent ontic properties of an underlying, more fundamental ontic substance.
• The hard problem of consciousness, as discussed in the context of the Springer Nature chapter, involves the question of the nature of the correlation between phenomenal and physical properties of consciousness.
• The hypothesis that physical properties are different from subjective (phenomenal) properties is unproven and serves as the foundation for the 'hard problem' framework.
• Some ontologies treated as 'monisms' suggest that both physical and phenomenal properties supervene on, or are aspects of, a more fundamental ontic category or principle, thereby avoiding the problem of treating them as two separate existing categories.
• David Chalmers does not consider a priori entailment between phenomenal and physical properties to be a necessary requirement for his theory of consciousness, preferring instead to rely on a contingent principle to explain the relationship.
• Consciousness epiphenomenalism is a view that accepts the causal closure of physics but maintains that phenomenal properties are metaphysically distinct from physical properties, asserting that while physical events can cause conscious properties, conscious properties cannot cause physical events.
• Dual aspect theory, neutral monism, and panpsychism hold that phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to basic physical properties, but may reduce to a more basic substance that possesses both physical and phenomenal properties.
• David Chalmers defines the physical as properties that can be sufficiently described from a third-person perspective, in contrast to phenomenal properties which can only be described from a first-person view.
• Under epiphenomenalism, phenomenal properties are lawfully correlated with physical properties, ensuring that a phenomenal property of a particular type occurs whenever a brain event of a corresponding type occurs, even though the phenomenal property does not cause the physical behavior.
• A dual-aspect view of consciousness holds that there is one basic underlying substance that possesses both physical and phenomenal properties.
• Russellian monism is not affected by the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument, and it supports a naturalist view on consciousness while integrating phenomenal and physical properties.
• Dual-aspect monism is defined by the view that phenomenal properties are either fundamental or constituted by protophenomenal properties, and that physical properties are relations between or structures of these phenomenal or protophenomenal properties.
• David Chalmers transforms the epistemological explanatory gap into an ontological gap between physical and phenomenal properties by arguing for the necessity of additional ontic categories.