Justification not yet generated — showing supporting facts

• David Chalmers defines protophenomenal properties as "special properties that are not themselves phenomenal (there is nothing it is like to have them) but that can collectively constitute phenomenal properties."
• If physical structure requires intrinsic realizers to exist, then phenomenal or protophenomenal realizers would possess an essential explanatory role rather than being epiphenomenal or overdetermining.
• Physical properties have realizers that possess phenomenal or protophenomenal properties.
• Protophenomenal properties are defined as properties that logically entail phenomenal properties (a functional definition) and are themselves neither physical nor phenomenal (a negative definition).
• Phenomenal properties of consciousness might represent a separate ontic category obeying 'psychophysical principles' that differ from those governing physical properties, while specifying how phenomenal or protophenomenal properties depend on physical properties.
• Protophenomenal properties are defined as intrinsic properties that are neither physical nor phenomenal, but are capable of constituting or causally producing phenomenal properties when combined appropriately.
• Phenomenal properties are the properties that characterize conscious experience, while protophenomenal properties are the properties involved in proto-consciousness.
• Protophenomenal properties are defined as properties that in certain combinations transparently account for the existence of consciousness, meaning one could in principle move a priori from knowing facts about protophenomenal properties to knowing facts about phenomenal properties.
• Dual-aspect monists argue that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are intrinsic.
• A more precise definition of protophenomenal properties is that they are properties which, in certain combinations, transparently account for the existence of consciousness, meaning one could in principle deduce phenomenal properties from knowledge of protophenomenal properties (Chalmers 2015; Goff 2015, 2017).
• Phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are the only intrinsic properties known to exist.
• Dual-aspect monism is defined by the view that phenomenal properties are either fundamental or constituted by protophenomenal properties, and that physical properties are relations between or structures of these phenomenal or protophenomenal properties.
• Dual-aspect monism posits that the broad principle of physical causal closure is compatible with the theory because the principle does not specify whether causal relations or structures possess intrinsic realizers, such as phenomenal or protophenomenal ones.