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Relations (1)
related 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts
The 'hard problem' is defined by the challenge of explaining how physical processes give rise to 'subjective experience' [1], a distinction formalized by David Chalmers who notes it is legitimate to question why cognitive functions are accompanied by such experience [2]. Furthermore, the 'hard problem' is frequently discussed in the context of the explanatory gap between physical brain processes and the nature of 'subjective experience' {fact:2, fact:3}.
Facts (4)
Sources
The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems cambridge.org 1 fact
referenceThe second criterion for distinguishing between hard and easy problems, as presented by David Chalmers, stipulates that it is legitimate to ask why the performance of specific cognitive and behavioral functions is accompanied by subjective experience.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
quoteAnd then there is the theory put forward by philosopher Colin McGinn that our vertigo when pondering the Hard Problem is itself a quirk of our brains. The brain is a product of evolution, and just as animal brains have their limitations, we have ours. Our brains can't hold a hundred numbers in memory, can't visualize seven-dimensional space and perhaps can't intuitively grasp why neural information processing observed from the outside should give rise to subjective experience on the inside.
Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and ... blossomanalysis.com 1 fact
claimThe authors of the paper 'Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and Opportunities' emphasize the necessity of epistemic humility, specifically advocating for the separation of modest, testable scientific claims regarding the contents and functions of consciousness from stronger, more speculative claims about solving the 'hard problem' of how subjective experience arises.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 1 fact
claimThe Hard Problem challenges non-reductive physicalism by asking how physical processes give rise to subjective experience; the response is that non-reductive physicalism attributes the explanatory gap to epistemological limitations rather than ontological differences.