Justification not yet generated — showing supporting facts

• The multiple realization objection, proposed by Fodor (1974) and Hellman and Thompson (1975), argues that mental properties are abstract and can be realized by diverse structural or chemical substrates, making strict identity with physical properties impossible.
• The mind-body problem is the philosophical inquiry into the relationship between the mind and the body, or between mental properties and physical properties.
• Subjective idealism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that the single substance possesses only mental properties throughout, and that physical properties are observer-dependent and not fully real.
• Dual-aspect monism posits that the physical and mental (or protomental) are two complementary aspects of a single underlying substance, where physical properties appear from a third-person, scientific perspective, and mental properties appear from a first-person, introspective perspective.
• Russell and the neo-Russellians posit that the compositional arrangements of psychophysically neutral elements determine the differences between mental and physical properties, rendering both reducible to a neutral domain.
• David Chalmers' 1996 work on 'consciousness and information' classifies mental and physical properties as reducible to a psychophysically neutral domain.
• Philosophically, panpsychism can be classified as either non-reductive physicalism or property dualism because particles are viewed as having both physical and mental properties.
• Non-reductive physicalism distinguishes itself from property dualism by maintaining that mental properties are entirely dependent on and determined by physical properties.
• Property dualism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that physical and mental properties are causally related or sharply distinct, rather than being complementary aspects, and typically posits that only some things possess mental properties.
• Harry Frankfurt claims that defining personhood as having both mental and physical properties is inadequate because many non-person entities possess both.
• Neutral monism, as analyzed in the context of William James's philosophy, does not provide complete independence of a substance from mental and physical properties, which may lead the theory toward panpsychism unless it is an idealistic variety.
• Physicalism differs from dual-aspect monism by asserting that the single substance possesses only physical properties throughout, with mental properties being constituted by physical properties.
• Subjective idealism posits that only mental properties are fundamental, while physicalism posits that only physical properties are fundamental.
• Interactionism faces a significant objection because mental properties, states, or substances are often considered to be of radically different kinds from physical ones, which supposedly prevents the communality necessary for interaction.
• David Chalmers supports property dualism, which is the idea that mental properties are not reducible to physical ones, even if they are tightly correlated.
• Supervenience in non-reductive physicalism is the principle that mental properties depend on physical properties, meaning no mental change can occur without a corresponding physical change, even though mental properties are not identical to physical ones.
• Type-type identity theory defines mental properties as identical to physical properties, similar to how the property of being water is identical to the property of being composed of H2O molecules.
• Critics argue that panpsychism is a form of property dualism because it posits that matter possesses both physical properties and irreducible mental properties.