Relations (1)

related 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts

Phenomenal consciousness is explicitly defined as states involving subjective experience in [1], and it is characterized by the 'something it is like' quality of subjective experience as noted in [2]. Furthermore, [3] and [4] reinforce this relationship by contrasting the non-reductive nature of subjective experience with functional accounts of phenomenal consciousness.

Facts (4)

Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 1 fact
claimThe 'structure and function argument' asserts that phenomenal consciousness cannot be reductively explained because it is not merely a function or structure, but involves subjective experience.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Capturing Christianity 1 fact
claimPhenomenal or qualitative consciousness is defined as states that involve subjective experience.
The evolutionary functions of consciousness royalsocietypublishing.org Royal Society Publishing 1 fact
claimAdaptive, functional accounts of phenomenal consciousness shift the focus of inquiry from the subjective experience of 'how it feels' to objective behavioural outcomes.
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying ... arxiv.org arXiv 1 fact
claimThe authors of 'Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying Objections and Constraints' define consciousness as phenomenal consciousness, which Thomas Nagel described as the fact of there being 'something it is like' to be a system, involving qualia or subjective experience.