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related 3.81 — strongly supporting 13 facts

Epiphenomenalism and physicalism are both central positions in the mind-body problem and mental causation debates, as evidenced by their inclusion in standard philosophical taxonomies [1], [2]. They are frequently contrasted, with some theorists arguing that physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism [3], while others maintain physicalism specifically to avoid the implausibility of epiphenomenalism [4].

Facts (13)

Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 6 facts
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that their position is less unattractive than the alternatives, specifically claiming that physicalism is refuted by the epistemic gap and interactionism is refuted by physical causal closure.
referenceCritics argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, specifically interactionism and physicalism, face the same explanatory challenges as epiphenomenalism regarding why specific psychophysical laws or constitution relations exist (Robinson 2007; Corabi 2014).
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that the lack of elegance in their theory is a moot point if competing theories like physicalism and interactionism are already refuted by the epistemic gap and physical causal closure.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, such as physicalism and interactionism, face the same improbability issues as epiphenomenalism because they must posit specific two-way psychophysical laws or identity relations to explain correlations between physical and mental states.
claimDualism may lead to epiphenomenalism, while physicalism is argued by some to deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness by reducing it to mere functioning or physical structure.
claimThere are four possible positions on mental causation: interactionism (which implies violation of physical causal closure), epiphenomenalism, overdetermination, and physicalism.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact
perspectiveWeak reductionists maintain adherence to physicalism because denying that consciousness is physical would render consciousness epiphenomenal, which is viewed as implausible.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Howard Robinson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact
claimPhilosophical concepts related to the mind-body problem include behaviorism, consciousness, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, identity theory, intentionality, mental causation, neutral monism, and physicalism.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1 fact
claimFrank Jackson defended epiphenomenalism in contemporary philosophy, although he later changed his stance to physicalism.
Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love Zia H Shah MD · The Muslim Times 1 fact
claimPanpsychism claims to avoid the eliminativist or epiphenomenalist tendencies of hardline physicalism by refusing to treat consciousness as an illusion or a byproduct with no causal power.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu William Seager, Sean Allen-Hermanson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact
referenceThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Panpsychism lists related entries including George Berkeley, consciousness, René Descartes, dualism, emergent properties, epiphenomenalism, Charles Hartshorne, William James, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, mereology, monism, neutral monism, pantheism, physicalism, qualia, quantum theory and consciousness, Josiah Royce, Baruch Spinoza, Alfred North Whitehead, and Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt.
Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com Springer 1 fact
claimThe sensational associative learning perspective is compatible with physicalism, panpsychism, and dualism, but is not compatible with epiphenomenalism.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 1 fact
claimGeorge Frederick Stout demonstrated that physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism and is therefore an inviable theory.