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cross_type 3.32 — strongly supporting 9 facts
Goldberg is a prominent philosopher who has extensively theorized about the epistemology of testimony, specifically addressing the duties of recipients {fact:1, fact:2}, the conditions for knowledge transfer {fact:4, fact:5, fact:9}, and the classification of anti-reductionist views {fact:6, fact:8}.
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Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 8 facts
accountIn the example provided by Goldberg (2005), a testifier (T) tells a hearer (S) that there is milk in the fridge based on evidence that is usually misleading because an eccentric writer (A) usually replaces the milk carton with an empty one, but A forgot to do so on this occasion.
quoteGoldberg (2001) argues that epistemologists of testimony should "widen our scope of interest from an exclusive focus on content-preserving cases of [testimonially-based] belief and knowledge to include all cases in which information is conveyed in a testimonially-based way from speaker to hearer."
claimPeter Graham (2006) categorizes philosophers who support a direct view of testimony as including Burge (1993, 1997, 1999), Coady (1973, 1992), Dummett (1994), Goldberg (2006), McDowell (1994), Quinton (1973), Reid (1764), Ross (1986), Rysiew (2000), Stevenson (1993), Strawson (1994), and Weiner (2003a).
claimGoldberg (2006) argues that both reductionists and non-reductionists can subscribe to a 'buck-passing principle,' where a recipient of testimony retains an epistemic duty to select a reliable testifier, similar to a client's duty to select a competent lawyer.
claimGoldberg (2006) argues that even if a testifier assumes responsibility for a proposition, the recipient of the testimony retains an epistemic duty to select a reliable testifier, similar to a client's duty to select a competent lawyer.
claimGoldberg argues that at time t+Δt, T also knows that p because T has the right to rely on A's failure to correct the testimony that p, making T's testimony safe and reliable at that later time.
claimGoldberg argues that in the 'Yankees-actually-won' case, the hearer's belief is safe and counts as knowledge because the hearer utilizes clues about the testifier's reliability—such as eye contact—in addition to the testimony itself, even when the testifier's own belief is based on wishful thinking.
referenceElizabeth Fricker published 'Varieties of Anti-Reductionism About Testimony—A Reply to Goldberg and Henderson' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2006.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimGoldberg (2010b) argues that asserting that p is not a necessary condition for testifying that p.