Knowledge Tree
Goldberg
Also known as: Sanford Goldberg
Facts (15)
Sources
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 12 facts
accountIn the example provided by Goldberg (2005), a testifier (T) tells a hearer (S) that there is milk in the fridge based on evidence that is usually misleading because an eccentric writer (A) usually replaces the milk carton with an empty one, but A forgot to do so on this occasion.
quoteGoldberg (2001) argues that epistemologists of testimony should "widen our scope of interest from an exclusive focus on content-preserving cases of [testimonially-based] belief and knowledge to include all cases in which information is conveyed in a testimonially-based way from speaker to hearer."
claimGoldberg argues that the factors that make a young child's testimonial belief amount to knowledge include information-processing that occurs in minds other than the child's own.
referenceThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy categorizes epistemological views on testimony based on conditions for the testifier (T-side) and the recipient (S-side), identifying four categories: Reductionism (demanding on both sides), Anti-Reductionism (demanding on T-side, less demanding on S-side), and other variations involving thinkers such as Audi, Fricker, Lackey, Burge, Plantinga, Ross, Welbourne, Goldberg, Graham, and Green.
claimPeter Graham (2006) categorizes philosophers who support a direct view of testimony as including Burge (1993, 1997, 1999), Coady (1973, 1992), Dummett (1994), Goldberg (2006), McDowell (1994), Quinton (1973), Reid (1764), Ross (1986), Rysiew (2000), Stevenson (1993), Strawson (1994), and Weiner (2003a).
claimGoldberg (2006) argues that both reductionists and non-reductionists can subscribe to a 'buck-passing principle,' where a recipient of testimony retains an epistemic duty to select a reliable testifier, similar to a client's duty to select a competent lawyer.
claimGoldberg (2006) argues that even if a testifier assumes responsibility for a proposition, the recipient of the testimony retains an epistemic duty to select a reliable testifier, similar to a client's duty to select a competent lawyer.
claimGoldberg argues that at time t+Δt, T also knows that p because T has the right to rely on A's failure to correct the testimony that p, making T's testimony safe and reliable at that later time.
claimGoldberg and Henderson argue that testimonial non-reductionists can require a subject (S) to be sensitive to signs of a testifier's (T) untrustworthiness.
claimGoldberg argues that in the 'Yankees-actually-won' case, the hearer's belief is safe and counts as knowledge because the hearer utilizes clues about the testifier's reliability—such as eye contact—in addition to the testimony itself, even when the testifier's own belief is based on wishful thinking.
referenceElizabeth Fricker published 'Varieties of Anti-Reductionism About Testimony—A Reply to Goldberg and Henderson' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2006.
claimJennifer Lackey identifies a group of philosophers who support non-reductionist views on the epistemology of testimony, including Austin (1946), Welbourne (1979, 1981, 1986, 1994), Evans (1982), Ross (1986), Hardwig (1985, 1991), Coady (1992, 1994), Reid (1764), Burge (1993, 1997), Plantinga (1993), Webb (1993), Dummett (1994), Foley (1994), McDowell (1994), Strawson (1994), Williamson (1996, 2000), Goldman (1999), Schmitt (1999), Insole (2000), Owens (2000), Rysiew (2002), Weiner (2003a), and Goldberg (2006).
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Apr 1, 2021 3 facts
claimGoldberg (2005) and Pelling (2013) present cases where a speaker's belief is unsafe and does not constitute knowledge, even though the hearer's belief derived from that speaker does constitute knowledge.
referenceGoldberg (2009) discusses how expert testimony influences the semantics of technical terms, linking epistemology and the philosophy of language.
claimGoldberg (2010b) argues that asserting that p is not a necessary condition for testifying that p.