Saul Kripke
Facts (13)
Sources
David Chalmers - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 6 facts
claimSaul Kripke argued in 'Naming and Necessity' that a name does not secure its reference via description fitting, but rather through a historical-causal link tracing back to the process of naming.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers disagrees with Saul Kripke and direct reference theorists in general regarding their theories of reference.
claimHilary Putnam and Saul Kripke proposed that Kripke's view on names can be applied to the reference of natural kind terms, a theory known as direct reference theory.
claimSaul Kripke posits that a name does not have a sense, or at least not a sense rich enough to determine reference, and that a name is a rigid designator that refers to the same object in all possible worlds.
referenceBefore Saul Kripke's 1970 lecture series 'Naming and Necessity', the orthodoxy in philosophy of language was descriptivism, as advocated by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell.
claimSaul Kripke suggests that scientific identity statements, such as 'Water is H2O', are necessary statements that are true in all possible worlds, a phenomenon he argues descriptivism cannot explain.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 2 facts
claimBefore Saul Kripke's work in 1972/1980, philosophers generally believed in contingent identity, which made the transition from the possibility of a mind existing without a body to the conclusion that the mind is a different entity from the body seem invalid.
claimSaul Kripke argues that epistemic possibilities, such as the idea that Hesperus might not be identical to Phosphorus, are not real possibilities.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 2 facts
perspectiveWillard Van Orman Quine and Saul Kripke conclude that there are no determinate facts about meaning because they believe neither physical nor mental facts can determine meaning.
referenceSaul Kripke argues in 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language' (1982) that physical facts cannot determine whether a person performing addition is actually performing 'quaddition', a function that behaves like addition for numbers up to 57 but outputs 5 for higher numbers.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 1 fact
referenceSaul Kripke (1982) notes that Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds relies on the claim that there is no conscious awareness of the self.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers, Joseph Levine, and Saul Kripke argue that philosophical zombies are impossible within the bounds of nature but possible within the bounds of logic, implying that facts about experience are not logically entailed by physical facts and that consciousness is irreducible.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers argues that Saul Kripke's treatment of a posteriori necessity cannot save materialism regarding consciousness because a posteriori constraints simply cause worlds to be redescribed rather than ruling conceivable worlds impossible.