Knowledge Tree
John R. Searle
Also known as: John R. Searle, John Searle
Facts (25)
Sources
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 5 facts
claimInternalist theories of mental content, such as those proposed by John Searle (1992), argue that conscious mental states have meanings intrinsically, whereas externalist theories, such as those by Dretske (1995), ground meaning in causal, counterfactual, or informational relations between intentional states and their objects.
claimRené Descartes (1644) and John Searle (1992) posit that conscious experiences exist as modes or states of a conscious self or subject, rather than as isolated mental atoms, a view contrasted by David Hume (1739).
claimJohn Searle (1992) describes the "intrinsic intentionality" of consciousness, which may correspond to the semantic sense of transparency.
perspectiveJohn Searle (1990) holds the perspective that only conscious states and dispositions to have conscious states can be genuinely intentional, a view that contrasts with the majority of theorists who regard intentionality as extending into the unconscious domain.
perspectiveOptimistic physicalists, such as Daniel Dennett (1991), John Searle (1992), and P. M. Churchland (1995), view current explanatory lapses regarding consciousness as temporary reflections of an early stage of inquiry that will be remedied in the future.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 4 facts
perspectivePhilosophers David Chalmers and John Searle consider Integrated Information Theory (IIT) to be a form of panpsychism.
referenceJohn Searle authored the article "Can Information Theory Explain Consciousness?" published in The New York Review of Books.
quoteJohn R. Searle stated in 'Consciousness and Language' (p. 47): 'Dualism makes the problem insoluble; materialism denies the existence of any phenomenon to study, and hence of any problem.'
perspectiveJohn Searle argues that panpsychism is meaningless because it lacks a clear definition and is unfalsifiable, stating: "It does not get up to the level of being false. It is strictly speaking meaningless because no clear notion has been given to the claim".
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 4 facts
perspectiveJohn Searle advocates that consciousness is a biological property whose conditions of emergence are comparable to the liquidity of water, while simultaneously suggesting that a revolution in the understanding of the physical world may be required to accommodate consciousness.
referenceJohn Searle authored the article 'Consciousness and the Philosophers', published in The New York Review of Books in 1997.
quoteJohn Searle describes panpsychism as an “absurd view” and asserts that thermostats do not have “enough structure even to be a remote candidate for consciousness.”
claimRoger Penrose (1989), John Searle (1991), Thomas Nagel (1979, 1986, 1999), and Noam Chomsky (1999) have all endorsed, suggested, or hinted at the idea that the problem of consciousness may necessitate a revolutionary change in physics.
Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences journal-psychoanalysis.eu 4 facts
claimMark Johnson (1987) proposed an approach to cognitive semantics, John Searle (1994) proposed ideas on ontological irreducibility, Gordon Globus (1995) proposed a post-modern brain model, Owen Flanagan (1992) proposed reflective equilibrium, and Bernard Baars proposed the theatre of consciousness model.
perspectiveThe author of 'Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences' disagrees with John Searle's inability to propose a solution to the epistemological issues involved in the study of consciousness, despite agreeing with Searle's defense of the irreducibility of consciousness.
quoteJohn Searle remarked on the limitations of materialist theories of mind: "[the philosopher] encounters difficulties. It always seems that he is leaving something out… [and] underlying the technical objections is a much deeper objection… [that] can be put quite simply: The theory in question has left out the mind; it has left out some essential feature of the mind, such as consciousness or qualia or semantic content… [Thus] if we were to think of the philosophy of mind as a single individual we would say of that person that he is compulsive neurotic, and his neurosis takes the form of repeating the same pattern of behavior over and over."
referenceJohn Searle published 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' in 1992 through MIT Press in Cambridge.
David Chalmers - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
A harder problem of consciousness: reflections on a 50-year quest ... frontiersin.org 2 facts
Consciousness and AI - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu Feb 5, 2026 1 fact
claimJohn Searle's 1980 'Chinese room' thought experiment challenges the possibility of AI minds by describing a person who manipulates symbols according to instructions to generate Chinese utterances without actually understanding the language, concluding that symbol manipulation is insufficient for intelligence or consciousness.
AI Sessions #9: The Case Against AI Consciousness (with Anil Seth) conspicuouscognition.com Feb 17, 2026 1 fact
claimHenry Shevlin notes that the argument that simulated weather systems do not get anyone wet is originally John Searle's point, which serves as a restatement of the disagreement regarding functionalism rather than a refutation of it.
Theories and Methods of Consciousness biomedres.us Jan 29, 2024 1 fact
referenceJohn R. Searle authored the book 'Mind: A Brief Introduction', which provides an overview of the mind-body problem.
Life, Intelligence, and Consciousness: A Functional Perspective longnow.org Aug 27, 2025 1 fact
quoteJohn Searle argues against functionalism by stating: “no one supposes that a computer simulation of a storm will leave us all wet, or a computer simulation of a fire is likely to burn the house down. Why on earth would anyone in his right mind suppose a computer simulation of mental processes actually had mental processes?”