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Hilary Kornblith
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Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 8 facts
referenceJoel Pust authored the critical notice 'Critical Notice of Hilary Kornblith’s On Reflection', published in Episteme in 2014.
claimHilary Kornblith and Doris (2015) express skepticism regarding the claim that there is a constitutive connection between self-consciousness and rationality.
claimHilary Kornblith challenges the rationalist view by questioning how adding second-order beliefs helps if first-order beliefs are not themselves responsive to reason.
quoteHilary Kornblith argues regarding responsiveness to reason: "While such responsiveness may be achieved, at times, by way of reflection on one’s beliefs and desires, it does not require any such reflection."
claimHilary Kornblith argues that non-reflective animals possess the capacity to rationally revise beliefs in the face of evidence.
referenceHilary Kornblith published 'On Reflection' through Oxford University Press in 2012.
referenceHilary Kornblith published 'Reasons, Naturalism, and Transcendental Philosophy' in 2011.
claimHilary Kornblith expresses skepticism regarding the role of self-consciousness in rationality, a position discussed by Pust (2014), M. Williams (2015), and Smithies (2016).
Naturalized Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 5, 2001 6 facts
referenceThe bibliography for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Naturalized Epistemology includes works by Robert Almeder (1998), Laurence BonJour (1994), Roderick Chisholm (1966, 1982, 1989), Richard Feldman (1999), Richard Foley (1994), Richard Fumerton (1994, 1995), Allan Gibbard (1990), Alvin Goldman (1979, 1992), Susan Haack (1993), Gilbert Harman (1977), Jaegwon Kim (1988), Philip Kitcher (1992), Hilary Kornblith (1988, 1994, 1999), Keith Lehrer (1997), William Lycan (1988), James Maffie (1990), John Pollock (1986), and W.V.O. Quine.
claimStephen Stich expresses sentiments similar to Hilary Kornblith's regarding the critique of epistemological standards, though potentially for different reasons.
claimPhilosophers including Alvin Goldman (1992), Stephen Stich and Richard Nisbett (1980), Gilbert Harman (1986), and Hilary Kornblith (1994) have expressed sentiments similar to Susan Haack regarding the relevance of empirical results to epistemology.
quoteHilary Kornblith wrote in 1999: "Of course knowledge is possible if we weaken the standards for knowledge far enough, in particular if we weaken them until we can show that many of our beliefs then pass the standards. But this seems to be nothing more than an exercise in self-congratulation. Why should we care about knowledge so defined?"
quoteHilary Kornblith wrote in 1999: "But if our standards for knowledge are merely designed to allow us to attach the epithet ‘knowledge’ to whatever it is we pretheoretically believe, then ... the result is an uncritical endorsement of the epistemological status quo."
claimHilary Kornblith defends a view close to Quinean Replacement Naturalism, arguing that traditional epistemologists who abandon the Cartesian program of deriving beliefs from certain foundations end up endorsing principles that merely ratify their pre-existing beliefs.
Naturalistic Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 4 facts
perspectiveHilary Kornblith argues that the causal structure of the world causes properties to cluster in natural kinds, which explains why inductive reasoning patterns are reliable.
referenceHilary Kornblith published 'Inductive inference and its natural ground' through MIT Press in 1993.
claimHilary Kornblith claims that human minds are natively equipped with mechanisms tuned to the causal structure of the world and the clustering of properties in natural kinds, making humans hard-wired to project properties in ways that are typically reliable.
referenceHilary Kornblith edited 'Naturalizing epistemology' (2nd edition), published by MIT Press in 1994.
Naturalized epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
referenceHilary Kornblith authored 'How Internal Can You Get?' in 1988, published in Synthese.
Naturalism in Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jan 8, 2016 1 fact
referenceHilary Kornblith authored the article 'In Defense of a Naturalized Epistemology', published in 'The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology' in 1999.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Feb 26, 2001 1 fact
referenceHilary Kornblith published 'Is philosophical knowledge possible?' in the 2013 book 'Disagreement and skepticism', edited by D. Machuca.