entity

Frank Jackson

Facts (16)

Sources

Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jun 18, 2004 4 facts

perspectiveFrank Jackson (2004) has charged non-reductive physicalism with incoherence because it attempts to claim physical realization while denying the ability to explain that relation in a strict and a priori intelligible way.

claimFrank Jackson's hypothetical scenario of Mary, the super color scientist, illustrates the claim that third-person theory has limits, specifically regarding what can be understood about experiencing red without having had that experience.

claimFrank Jackson expressed a contrary view to his earlier knowledge argument in his 1998 and 2004 publications.

claimFrank Jackson (1993) notes that it is controversial whether a priori deducibility of the explanandum from the explanans is a necessary or sufficient criterion for explaining consciousness.

Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Howard Robinson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 19, 2003 2 facts

perspectiveThe author argues that Frank Jackson's analogy of evolutionary by-products fails for mental states because the laws of physics governing brain states do not explain why those brain states produce conscious experiences.

claimFrank Jackson (1982) argues that mental states are evolutionary by-products of brain states, using the analogy that the heaviness of a polar bear's coat is a side effect of the coat's warmth-providing function.

Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 2 facts

referenceFrank Jackson authored the paper 'Mind and Illusion', published in the Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements in 2003.

claimFrank Jackson defended epiphenomenalism in contemporary philosophy, although he later changed his stance to physicalism.

Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press Dec 20, 2023 2 facts

claimFrank Jackson's version of the knowledge argument utilizes a thought experiment about a scientist named Mary who possesses complete physical knowledge of color vision while living in a black-and-white room, despite having never seen color.

claimC.D. Broad and Frank Jackson argued that conscious states could evolve as by-products of useful brain states, even if those conscious states themselves are inert.

Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact

referenceFrank Jackson authored the article 'What Mary didn’t Know,' published in the Journal of Philosophy in 1986.

Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying ... arxiv.org arXiv Nov 20, 2025 1 fact

referenceFrank Jackson's Mary argument is a notable contribution to the reductionism versus emergentism debate regarding the nature of consciousness.

What is hard about the “hard problem of consciousness”? philosophy.stackexchange.com Philosophy Stack Exchange Nov 18, 2020 1 fact

claimThe 'Hard Problem' of consciousness claim is built on the same conceptual notions as Frank Jackson's 'Knowledge Argument', which is also known as 'Mary’s Room' or 'Mary the Color Scientist'.

(PDF) Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness - Academia.edu academia.edu Oxford University Press 1 fact

referenceFrank Jackson published 'Epiphenomenal Qualia' in The Philosophical Quarterly in 1982.

David Chalmers - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1 fact

claimDavid Chalmers, along with Frank Jackson and others, played a major role in developing two-dimensional semantics.

The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org David Chalmers · Oxford University Press 1 fact

claimFrank Jackson's 'Mary's Room' thought experiment demonstrates that seeing red provides new information that is not entailed by physical facts alone.