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E.J. Lowe
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Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 7 facts
claimE.J. Lowe and David Hodgson argue that the 'easy' problems of consciousness, such as explaining discrimination and reportability, are as difficult as the 'hard' problem of consciousness.
claimE.J. Lowe holds that true reports and discriminations can only be made by systems with the capacity for thought, which requires consciousness.
claimE.J. Lowe argues that the 'easy' problems of consciousness are difficult because they require explaining more than just the performance of functions.
claimE.J. Lowe, Max Velmans, and Benjamin Libet have expressed concerns regarding David Chalmers' use of the term 'awareness' as a functionally defined concept distinct from consciousness.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers rejects the inference made by E.J. Lowe that his use of the term 'awareness' implies humans are only 'aware' in an attenuated, functional sense.
accountThe symposium on David Chalmers' paper 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness' included 26 commentaries from various scholars, including Bernard Baars, Douglas Bilodeau, Patricia Churchland, Tom Clark, C.J.S. Clarke, Francis Crick, Christof Koch, Daniel Dennett, Stuart Hameroff, Roger Penrose, Valerie Hardcastle, David Hodgson, Piet Hut, Roger Shepard, Benjamin Libet, E.J. Lowe, Bruce MacLennan, Colin McGinn, Eugene Mills, Kieron O'Hara, Tom Scutt, Mark Price, William Robinson, Gregg Rosenberg, William Seager, Jonathan Shear, Henry Stapp, Francisco Varela, Max Velmans, and Richard Warner.
perspectiveE.J. Lowe argues that the invariance principle 'sells out completely' to functionalism.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 5 facts
claimE. J. Lowe is a substance dualist who holds that a normal human being involves two substances: a body and a person.
claimE. J. Lowe's theory of substance dualism differs from René Descartes's because Lowe does not define the person as a purely mental substance defined solely by thought or consciousness.
claimE. J. Lowe claims that his theory of substance dualism is close to P. F. Strawson's theory presented in 1959, though he acknowledges Strawson would not have labeled it substance dualism.
claimE. J. Lowe argues that the bundle theory is untenable because it presupposes that the identity conditions of psychological modes can be provided without relying on reference to persons, whereas the identity of any psychological mode actually depends on the identity of the person who possesses it.
claimE. J. Lowe defends the argument against the bundle theory by asserting that psychological modes are essentially modes of persons, and therefore persons can be conceived of as substances.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
referenceE.J. Lowe authored 'Subjects of Experience', published in 1996 by Cambridge University Press.