Knowledge Tree
zombies
Facts (16)
Sources
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 6 facts
quote“In The Conscious Mind I called this ‘the paradox of phenomenal judgment’ and argued that, while it is strange (many strange things happen in other possible worlds), it does nothing to undermine the coherence of zombies. [...] I argue that an appropriate account of the content and epistemology of our phenomenal judgments shows that there is no problem here”
claimThe existence of qualia is the only thing an individual can know for certain, regardless of whether other people are 'zombies' or not.
quoteDaniel Dennett argues that zombies are actual and that nobody is conscious in the mysterious way that supports doctrines like epiphenomenalism, stating: “Are zombies possible? They’re not just possible, they’re actual. We’re all zombies. Nobody is conscious — not in the systematically mysterious way that supports such doctrines as epiphenomenalism”
claimDavid Chalmers's 'zombies' have become a standard element in recent philosophical discussions regarding consciousness.
referenceRobert Kirk published 'Zombies vs materialists' in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in 1974.
claimAssuming the intrinsic essence of relata is logically necessary would preclude the existence of zombies, because it would make a physically identical world without phenomenal properties impossible.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 3 facts
claimArguments for anti-physicalism regarding the ontology of consciousness often rely on a priori reasoning, such as the conceivability of zombies as proposed by Kirk in 1970 and Chalmers in 1996, or the knowledge argument as proposed by Jackson in 1982 and 1986.
perspectiveRobert Kirk (1970) and David Chalmers (1996) assert that 'zombies' (beings identical to humans but lacking qualia) are possible in worlds that share all our physical laws, while Daniel Dennett (1991) and Joseph Levine (2001) deny this possibility.
claimProponents of anti-physicalist arguments, including Keith Campbell, Robert Kirk, and David Chalmers, have appealed to the conceivability of zombies—beings molecularly identical to conscious humans but devoid of phenomenal consciousness—to support their positions.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 2 facts
claimDavid Chalmers argues that (1) zombies are perfectly conceivable, (2) if zombies are conceivable, then they are metaphysically possible, and (3) if zombies are metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false.
claimDavid Chalmers defines zombies as beings who are identical to humans in every physical respect, including external behavior and internal brain states, but who lack phenomenal consciousness.
David Chalmers - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers stated that, as far as he knows, the first paper in the philosophical literature to talk at length about zombies under that name was Robert Kirk's 'Zombies vs.'.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers uses the concept of 'zombies'—creatures that are physically and functionally identical to humans but lack consciousness—to demonstrate that consciousness cannot be functionally analyzed.
PANPSYCHISM (Philosophy of Mind Series) - Amazon.com amazon.com 1 fact
perspectiveThe author asserts that mainstream physicalism is incoherent and that David Chalmers' concept of 'Zombies,' such as a 'Zombie electron,' is logically impossible.