Knowledge Tree
veto players
Facts (13)
Sources
How governments address climate change through carbon pricing ... nature.com Apr 15, 2025 13 facts
claimMultiple veto players can facilitate comprehensive reforms by fostering negotiation and compromise, often favoring fully effective, wide-ranging changes over partial reforms.
claimThe author of the study suggests that future research on carbon pricing policies should place a stronger focus on the role of veto players.
referenceMadden, N. J. published 'Green means stop: veto players and their impact on climate-change policy outputs' in Environmental Politics, volume 23, pages 570–589, in 2014.
claimVeto players (actors with the lowest environmental salience) can have a positive effect on carbon pricing intensity, as an increased distance to the veto player is accompanied by increased carbon pricing intensity.
referenceGehlbach and Malesky (2010) analyzed the contribution of veto players to economic reform.
perspectiveThe role of veto players in carbon pricing policies requires stronger focus in future research.
claimThe translation of government positions into climate policies depends on the number and preferences of veto players in the political system, with policy change being less likely when veto players are strong and ideologically distant from each other.
referenceThe book 'Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work' (Princeton University Press, 2002) presents a theoretical framework for understanding how political institutions influence policy outcomes.
claimVeto players play a minor role in the decision-making process of carbon pricing, as indicated by the lack of statistical significance in the coefficient of adjusted government position.
referenceThe article 'Green means stop: veto players and their impact on climate-change policy outputs' (Environ. Politics 23, 570–589, 2014) applies veto player theory to analyze climate change policy outputs.
claimMultiple veto players can result in comprehensive reforms by fostering negotiation and compromise, as these actors often favor fully effective, wide-ranging changes over partial reforms.
quoteSchulze stated: "for a one-dimensional space depicting environmental policy preferences, the number of decisive veto players […] reduces to the one player with the least pronounced preferences for environmental protection, and not the entire ideological range along this dimension."
claimVeto players play a minor role in the decision-making process of carbon pricing.