concept

Supervenience

Also known as: supervenience thesis

Facts (18)

Sources

Naturalized Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jul 5, 2001 10 facts

claimIf epistemic support facts are natural facts and justification is defined by evidence possessed and epistemic support, then justification is defined in entirely natural terms, removing the need for evidentialists to rely on supervenience to defend naturalism.

claimThe supervenience thesis states that in any two worlds in which all the natural facts are alike, all the evaluative facts are also alike.

claimPhilosopher Keith Lehrer denies the supervenience thesis.

claimReliabilism asserts that the crucial facts in the supervenience base of epistemic facts are facts regarding the reliability of the causal process that produces or sustains a belief.

claimJaegwon Kim argues that the term 'naturalism' is used ambiguously between 'ethical naturalism' and 'epistemological naturalism', where the former requires definitions in natural terms while the latter requires only supervenience.

claimThe supervenience thesis regarding epistemic status asserts that if two believers share all the same natural properties, then the same beliefs are justified for them.

perspectiveSome naturalists argue that a substantive naturalist view must treat epistemic facts as supervening on causal facts rather than logical facts.

claimPhilosophers Chisholm (1982) and Van Cleve (1985) have written passages similar to the supervenience thesis, including those who would not typically be regarded as naturalists.

claimJaegwon Kim holds the view that epistemic facts are natural facts if they supervene on unquestionably natural facts, a position shared by nearly all participants in the debate.

claimTraditionalists in epistemology often regard epistemic support facts as necessary truths, and this necessity allows evidentialists to endorse the supervenience thesis.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 2 facts

claimThe author of the source text observes that David Chalmers' use of the phrase "give rise" in his definition of the hard problem implies a supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical.

claimDavid Chalmers associates the concept of reducibility with supervenience, which is an ontological concept.

Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Nov 30, 2004 1 fact

formulaThe minimal framework for studying reduction, supervenience, or emergence relations between material brain states [ma] and mental states [me] is represented by the relation [ma] ↔ [me].

David Chalmers and the hard problem of consciousness - Medium medium.com Chris Mathers · Medium May 7, 2024 1 fact

claimDavid Chalmers' arguments against a materialist explanation of consciousness rely on the concepts of supervenience and logically possible worlds.

Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Nov 30, 2004 1 fact

referenceThe framework for studying reduction, supervenience, or emergence relations between material brain states and mental states of consciousness is discussed by Kim (1998) and Stephan (1999).

Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press Dec 20, 2023 1 fact

claimSupervenience between mind and brain is a correlation where there can be no change in consciousness without a corresponding change in the brain, though there can be a brain change without a change in consciousness.

Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com Theories of Consciousness 1 fact

claimSupervenience in non-reductive physicalism is the principle that mental properties depend on physical properties, meaning no mental change can occur without a corresponding physical change, even though mental properties are not identical to physical ones.

The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org David Chalmers · Oxford University Press 1 fact

claimPatricia and Paul Churchland criticized David Chalmers' claim that everything except consciousness logically supervenes on the physical, arguing that this failure of supervenience does not necessarily mean materialism is false, citing heat and luminescence as physical properties that do logically supervene on the physical.