concept

Strong reductionism

Also known as: strong reductionists, strong reductionist

Facts (12)

Sources

Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 5 facts

claimStrong reductionists reject arguments supporting the hard problem of consciousness—such as the possibility of functional organization without consciousness or the Mary's room thought experiment—as mistaken intuitions.

claimHigher-order theories of consciousness are a notable family of strong reductionist accounts.

claimStrong reductionists hold that phenomenal consciousness exists but can be fully understood as reducible to the brain and functional terms as an emergent property of the material brain.

claimType-C materialism is compatible with several metaphysical views and may resolve into other types depending on scientific discovery: it resolves to strong reductionism (Type A) with evidence of emergence, Type-B materialism with a different cultural paradigm, property dualism (Type D) if explained by the quantum mind, or Type-F monism if intrinsic properties in physics extend beyond structure and dynamics.

claimType-A materialists who believe in the reality of phenomenal consciousness but argue it is not an addition to certain functions or behaviors hold a view known as strong reductionism.

Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 4 facts

claimStrong reductionism holds that consciousness exists but is reducible to tractable, functional, and non-intrinsic properties.

claimStrong reductionism holds that consciousness can be broken down and explained in terms of simpler things, rejecting the idea that experience is a simple, basic, or metaphysical 'ground floor.'

claimStrong reductionists assert that consciousness is not as it prima facie appears, and that qualities like immediacy, indescribability, and independence are only apparent, not intrinsic.

claimStrong reductionism claims that the reductive explanation of consciousness fully explains all aspects of consciousness without remainder.

Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Nov 30, 2004 2 facts

claimA third class of counterarguments against strong reductionism refers to the difficulty of including notions of temporal present and nowness in a physical description.

claimStrong reductionism leads to a monistic picture where mental states are either eliminated or considered epiphenomenal.

Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Nov 30, 2004 1 fact

claimStrong reductionism claims that all mental states and properties can be reduced to the material domain (materialism) or to physics (physicalism), asserting that exploring the material domain is both necessary and sufficient to understand the mental domain.