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sense of ownership
Also known as: feeling of ownership
Facts (19)
Sources
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 18 facts
perspectiveJosé Luis Bermúdez (2011) argues for a reductive account of the sense of ownership over one's own body, consisting of the phenomenology of the spatial location of bodily sensations combined with the disposition to judge the body in which they occur as one's own.
perspectiveZahavi and Kriegel (2015) defend a non-reductive understanding of the sense of ownership, viewing it as a distinct aspect of the phenomenal character of experience.
claimA common philosophical response to the problem of thought insertion involves distinguishing between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency, and claiming that subjects of thought insertion lack the sense of agency while retaining the sense of ownership.
claimDan Zahavi (2005) argues that pre-reflective consciousness or the sense of ownership are necessary conditions of consciousness.
claimThe standard view of thought insertion and anarchic hand syndrome posits that these conditions can be explained by a lack of a sense of agency, while the sense of ownership remains intact because the subject feels the thought or action is taking place within their own mind.
referenceThe sense of an experience as one's own can be understood as the self being implicitly given in the mode of conscious awareness, according to Musholt (2015).
perspectiveThomas Metzinger (2003) claims that the variety of ways in which self-consciousness can break down poses a challenge to the idea that the sense of ownership is a universal characteristic of experience.
claimA three-way distinction can be made between the sense of agency (the sense that one is the author of a mental state), the sense of ownership (the sense that one is the owner of a mental state), and the sense of location (the sense that a mental state is located within one's own mind).
claimM.G.F. Martin explored bodily awareness and the sense of ownership in his 1995 work 'Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership'.
referenceJérôme Dokic authored 'The Sense of Ownership: An Analogy Between Sensation and Action' in 2003, published in the collection 'Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds'.
claimSome philosophers argue that if subjects experiencing thought insertion are actually aware of their own thoughts, then either the sense of ownership is not a necessary feature of conscious experience, or the sense of ownership does not exist at all.
claimThe sense of ownership is a candidate for explaining immunity to error through misidentification because if conscious experiences seem to be one's own, there is no need for identification of the experience's subject as oneself.
referenceFrédérique de Vignemont investigates the sense of ownership of one's own body in her 2007 paper 'Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One’s Own Body'.
claimA reductive account of the sense of ownership explains it in terms of cognitive and/or experiential states whose existence is independently endorsed.
claimSome critics argue that subjects of thought insertion may retain a sense of location rather than a sense of ownership, meaning they accept that the inserted thought occurs within the boundary of their own mind even while denying that they are the authors of those thoughts.
claimThe 'sense of ownership' helps explain why it is difficult to conceive of experiencing a thought located in another person's mind or pain located in another person's body.
claimA philosophical view of self-consciousness claims that various forms of experience involve a 'sense of ownership,' where individuals are aware of their own states as their own.
referenceThe 'sense of ownership' or 'sense of mineness' is a concept in cognitive science and philosophy where a subject is aware of their thoughts, actions, emotions, perceptual experiences, memories, and bodily experiences as being their own.
Self-Consciousness - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu Jul 24, 2024 1 fact
perspectiveIf the feeling of ownership is understood representationally, it risks collapsing into the judgments of ownership it is intended to explain.