concept

physical event

Also known as: physical event, physical events

Facts (17)

Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press Dec 20, 2023 5 facts
claimSubjective idealism interprets the argument from physical causal closure not as evidence of physical events having sufficient physical causes, but as evidence of regularities holding between various kinds of perceptions or experiences.
claimThe principle of physical causal closure allows for the possibility that some physical events, such as quantum events, are truly random and lack a cause, while maintaining that all caused physical events, including human behavior, have complete physical explanations.
claimThe principle of physical causal closure asserts that every physical event that has a cause has a complete physical explanation.
claimInteractionist dualism is ruled out by the broad version of the principle of physical causal closure because interactionist dualism claims that some physical events, such as human behavior, require explanation through fundamental psychophysical laws rather than physical laws.
claimInteractionist dualism posits additional non-physical causal structure that is required to explain certain physical events, such as behavior, which differs from the structure posited by epiphenomenalist or overdetermination dualism.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Howard Robinson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 19, 2003 4 facts
claimEpiphenomenalism is a theory which posits that mental events are caused by physical events but have no causal influence on the physical world, serving as a way to avoid the problem of how immaterial and material things interact.
claimInteractionism is the view that the mind and body, or mental events and physical events, causally influence each other.
claimMills argues that the argument claiming interactionism violates physical closure is invalid because a physical event can possess features that are not explained by the event which serves as its sufficient cause.
quoteMills (1996) states: 'For X to be a cause of Y, X must contribute something to Y. The only way a purely mental event could contribute to a purely physical one would be to contribute some feature not already determined by a purely physical event.'
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3 facts
claimInteractionist dualism requires the rejection of the principle of causal closure, which is the claim that every physical event is fully determined by a physical cause.
claimConsciousness epiphenomenalism is a view that accepts the causal closure of physics but maintains that phenomenal properties are metaphysically distinct from physical properties, asserting that while physical events can cause conscious properties, conscious properties cannot cause physical events.
claimThe principle of causal closure states that the physical world is causally closed, meaning all physical events have physical causes.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 2 facts
claimMost authors in the field of consciousness studies take physical influence on the phenomenal for granted, while the assumption that consciousness might influence physical events is considered to require solid proof.
claimPostulating an additional fundamental natural principle to explain the impact of consciousness on physical events is problematic because known natural laws appear to provide a sufficient explanation for all physical events, making an additional influence redundant or leading to overdetermination.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu William Seager, Sean Allen-Hermanson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimThe principle of the causal closure of the physical world asserts that for every physical event, there is a purely physical explanation for its occurrence that makes no reference to mental properties.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers posits that if the physical domain is causally closed (meaning every physical event has a physical explanation) and consciousness is non-physical, it appears there is no room for consciousness to play a causal role.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jul 13, 2017 1 fact
quoteDerek Parfit identifies two prominent reductionist claims: first, that 'a person’s existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental event'; and second, that '[t]hough persons exist, we could give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist.'