phenomenalism
Facts (11)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 11 facts
claimPhenomenalism posits that physical objects have the potential to produce experiences even when unperceived, which allows physical objects to exist stably and appear in a regular way when perceived.
claimA criticism of Michael Pelczar's defense of phenomenalism is that it blurs the distinction between phenomenalism and dualism, as the world of potentials becomes indistinguishable from the physical world described by dispositionalists.
claimPhenomenalism asserts that potentials to produce experience are basic and not grounded in any underlying structure or properties.
claimAccording to the classic version of phenomenalism, physical objects are defined as potentials to produce perceptions and nothing else.
claimPhenomenalism posits that physical objects are primarily potentials for physical effects, with some mental or perceptual effects in addition, rather than being potentials for perceptions primarily.
perspectiveCritics argue that phenomenalism is implausible because it suggests fundamental potentials of physical objects are directed solely toward producing perceptions, which is viewed as anthropocentric and inconsistent with physics.
claimMichael Pelczar (2023) defended phenomenalism by arguing that potentials for experience can also possess potentials to affect other potentials, allowing them to mirror the structure of the physical world as described by physics.
claimPhenomenalism posits that the physical world consists in potentials for conscious perceptions, distinguishing it from subjective idealism, which posits that the physical world consists in the perceptions themselves.
claimPhenomenalism can be considered a form of dualism because it posits fundamental consciousness alongside fundamental, non-mental potentials for perceptions.
referencePhenomenalism faces a conflict with the principle of physical causal closure that is essentially identical to the conflict faced by substance dualism, according to Pelczar (2019).
claimUnder phenomenalism, the mental is either epiphenomenal (does not affect physical potentials), affects physical potentials in an overdetermining way, or requires denying physical causal closure.