concept

perceptions

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Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press Dec 20, 2023 16 facts
quoteGeorge Berkeley summarizes his view that physical objects consist in nothing more than collections of perceptions with the phrase: "esse est percipi" (to be is to be perceived).
claimGeorge Berkeley argues that all that fundamentally exists are mental subjects and their ideas, where 'ideas' refers to mental states in general, including perceptions and thoughts.
claimAccording to the classic version of phenomenalism, physical objects are defined as potentials to produce perceptions and nothing else.
claimSubjective idealism interprets the argument from physical causal closure not as evidence of physical events having sufficient physical causes, but as evidence of regularities holding between various kinds of perceptions or experiences.
claimPhenomenalism posits that physical objects are primarily potentials for physical effects, with some mental or perceptual effects in addition, rather than being potentials for perceptions primarily.
claimSubjective idealism interprets the previous explanatory successes of science as revealing regularities between perceptions of higher-level complex phenomena and perceptions of lower-level mechanisms, rather than revealing that higher-level phenomena are physically constituted.
quoteJohn Stuart Mill defined physical objects as "permanent possibilities of sensation," meaning they are potentials for or dispositions to produce perceptions rather than collections of perceptions themselves.
perspectiveCritics argue that phenomenalism is implausible because it suggests fundamental potentials of physical objects are directed solely toward producing perceptions, which is viewed as anthropocentric and inconsistent with physics.
claimSubjective idealism faces the challenge of explaining why regularities between perceptions hold both within and between subjects, as leaving them unexplained implies they are coincidental.
referenceYetter-Chappell, Goldschmidt, and Pearce (2017) suggest that fundamental mental laws could potentially explain the regularities of perceptions, arguing this would be no more inexplicable than fundamental physical laws.
claimThe ordinary view of physical objects posits that they primarily possess potentials to cause effects on other physical objects, such as movement or heat, rather than solely causing perceptions.
claimMental laws coordinating perceptions would be highly complicated compared to physical laws because human-type experiences are countless, whereas physics currently posits only about seventeen fundamental particles.
claimPhenomenalism can be considered a form of dualism because it posits fundamental consciousness alongside fundamental, non-mental potentials for perceptions.
claimSubjective idealism explains mind-brain correlations by regarding brain states as perceptions of one subject (a person observing someone else's brain) and conscious states as the perceptions or other conscious states of another subject (the person whose brain is being observed).
claimSubjective idealism requires positing correlations between the perceptions of different subjects, unless the theory is combined with solipsism.
claimGeorge Berkeley argues that the notion of an unperceived physical object is incoherent because any attempt to conceive of an unperceived object implicitly involves conceiving of the perceptions one would have of that object.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jul 13, 2017 3 facts
claimPhilosophers who support David Hume's view that introspection reveals only perceptions include Shoemaker (1986), Martin (1997), Howell (2010), and Prinz (2012).
claimDavid Hume rejected the idea that introspection reveals the self, claiming that when he introspected, he could never catch himself, but only perceptions.
claimPhilosophers who oppose David Hume's view that introspection reveals only perceptions include Chisholm (1976), Cassam (1995), G. Strawson (2009), Damasio (2010), and Rosenthal (2012).
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Howard Robinson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 19, 2003 2 facts
quoteDavid Hume described the mind as a theatre, stating: "The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations."
claimDavid Hume asserted that when he introspects, he only encounters specific perceptions like heat, cold, light, shade, love, hatred, pain, or pleasure, and can never observe a self independent of these perceptions.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 1 fact
claimNeuroscience has invested significant effort into associating cognitive activities, perceptions, feelings, and memories with specific neuronal processes, such as neuron firing and neurotransmitter activity in particular brain areas.
Here is my contribution to Ockham day. (P1) Aristotle's theory of the ... facebook.com Facebook Apr 10, 2023 1 fact
claimThomas Reid posited that a thorough analysis of consciousness reveals that "natural and original judgments" accompany perceptions.
Seven-Year Experiment Uncovers New Insights into Nature of ... sci.news Sci.News May 1, 2025 1 fact
claimThe researchers observed functional connections between neurons in early visual areas of the brain and the frontal areas of the brain, which helps explain how perceptions tie to thoughts.
Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love Zia H Shah MD · The Muslim Times May 7, 2025 1 fact
claimThe combination problem in panpsychism refers to the challenge of explaining how complex human consciousness, such as thoughts and perceptions, arises from the simpler forms of consciousness attributed to basic matter.