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Non-reductive physicalism
Also known as: nonreductive materialism, Nonreductive Physicalism
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Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 14 facts
claimThe Causal Exclusion Problem challenges non-reductive physicalism by asking what causal work is left for mental properties if physical causes are sufficient to explain all effects; the response is that mental properties are patterns in physical causes that influence outcomes through organizational properties.
claimNon-reductive physicalism occupies a middle ground between reductive physicalism, which claims mental states are identical to physical states, and dualism, which posits mental substances separate from physical reality.
claimNon-reductive physicalism solves the problem of multiple realizability by explaining how different physical systems, such as human brains, alien biology, or future AI, can instantiate consciousness through functional organization.
claimYujin Nagasawa explores how non-reductive physicalism can accommodate both scientific accounts of consciousness and philosophical arguments about existence and value.
claimNon-Reductive Physicalism posits that consciousness is an emergent property of physical systems with irreducible characteristics, acknowledging both a physical basis and unique properties of the mind.
claimThe explanatory gap in non-reductive physicalism suggests that even complete physical knowledge may not fully explain subjective experience, indicating an epistemic rather than an ontological gap.
claimNon-reductive physicalism respects explanatory autonomy by recognizing that psychology and neuroscience provide different but complementary explanations of mental phenomena.
claimNon-reductive physicalism posits that consciousness emerges from the complex organizational properties of neural systems rather than solely from their physical components.
perspectiveNon-reductive physicalism is a framework for understanding consciousness that attempts to balance scientific evidence with philosophical nuance.
claimNon-reductive physicalism distinguishes itself from property dualism by maintaining that mental properties are entirely dependent on and determined by physical properties.
perspectiveNon-reductive physicalism is a philosophy of mind position that asserts consciousness is entirely physical in its ontology, yet mental properties are not reducible to physical properties and require their own level of explanation.
claimThe Hard Problem challenges non-reductive physicalism by asking how physical processes give rise to subjective experience; the response is that non-reductive physicalism attributes the explanatory gap to epistemological limitations rather than ontological differences.
claimSupervenience in non-reductive physicalism is the principle that mental properties depend on physical properties, meaning no mental change can occur without a corresponding physical change, even though mental properties are not identical to physical ones.
claimNon-reductive physicalism preserves mental causation by accounting for how thoughts and intentions can cause actions without requiring magical intervention in physical processes.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 7 facts
perspectiveCritics such as Jaegwon Kim (1987, 1998) argue that non-reductive physicalism fails to provide an adequate account of how conscious properties are realized by underlying neural, physical, or functional structures.
claimNon-reductive physicalism combines ontological physicalism with the view that special sciences, such as economics, possess autonomous conceptual and representational levels that are not reducible to the underlying physical substrate, as supported by Hilary Putnam (1975), Richard Boyd (1980), and Jerry Fodor (1974).
perspectiveRobert Van Gulick replied to critics of non-reductive physicalism in 1993, defending the coherence of such views.
referenceC. Hardin published 'Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors' in the book 'Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism', edited by A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, in 1992.
perspectiveFrank Jackson (2004) has charged non-reductive physicalism with incoherence because it attempts to claim physical realization while denying the ability to explain that relation in a strict and a priori intelligible way.
perspectiveNonreductive physicalists argue that while an account of psycho-physical realization is necessary, it does not need to be a priori deducible to satisfy explanatory demands regarding consciousness.
referenceRobert Van Gulick published 'Nonreductive materialism and intertheoretical constraint' in the 1992 book 'Emergence and Reduction', edited by A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim and published by De Gruyter.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 2 facts
claimProperty dualism is distinct from non-reductive physicalism.
claimNon-reductive physicalism, as described by Donald Davidson in 1980, asserts that phenomenal properties are not identical to physical properties, but that specific instances of phenomenal properties are fully constituted by instances of physical properties.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 1 fact
claimNon-reductive physicalism is a label used for versions of materialism that attempt to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 1 fact
referenceBrian P. McLaughlin authored 'The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism', published in the book 'Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism' (edited by A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Jim) by De Gruyter in 1992 (pages 49–93).
The Compatibility of Christianity with Panpsychism, Part 1 theologycommons.gcu.edu Sep 2, 2025 1 fact
perspectiveLanell M. Mason argues that the substance dualist claim that conscious entities are distinct is compatible with non-reductive physicalism and does not sufficiently define substance dualism as a distinct view of the mind and body.