concept

Interactionist dualism

Also known as: Interactionist dualists, interactionist ontological dualism

Facts (20)

Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press Dec 20, 2023 7 facts
claimInteractionist dualism faces objections regarding the uncertainty of its scientific claims.
claimThe principle of physical causal closure rules out interactionist dualism, which is the view that non-physical conscious states can cause physical effects that would not result from physical causes alone.
claimInteractionist dualism suggests consciousness may cause physical behavior either independently or in conjunction with physical causes, where neither is sufficient on its own, similar to how a forest fire requires both drought and a lightning strike.
claimInteractionist dualists, such as John Eccles and Karl Popper in 1977, have proposed that consciousness influences the outcome of quantum collapse.
claimInteractionist dualism is ruled out by the broad version of the principle of physical causal closure because interactionist dualism claims that some physical events, such as human behavior, require explanation through fundamental psychophysical laws rather than physical laws.
claimInteractionist dualism posits that consciousness and the physical world mutually influence each other through two-way psychophysical laws, meaning physical effects of mental causes lack sufficient physical causes and are not overdetermined.
claimInteractionist dualism posits additional non-physical causal structure that is required to explain certain physical events, such as behavior, which differs from the structure posited by epiphenomenalist or overdetermination dualism.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 5 facts
claimInteractionist dualism requires the rejection of the principle of causal closure, which is the claim that every physical event is fully determined by a physical cause.
claimRené Descartes held the view known as interactionist dualism, which asserts that conscious mental properties can have a causal impact upon physical matter.
claimInteractionist dualism, encompassing both substance and property types, holds that consciousness is causally efficacious in the production of bodily behavior.
claimRecent defenders of interactionist dualism include Foster (1991), Hodgson (1991), Lowe (1996), Popper and Eccles (1977), H. Robinson (1982), Stapp (1993), and Swinburne (1986).
claimThe principle of causal closure is considered a long-held principle in the sciences, and its rejection by interactionist dualism marks a strong break from current scientific orthodoxy, though some philosophers like Collins (2011) have addressed this.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers identifies two categories of alternatives to epiphenomenalism: denying the causal closure of the physical domain to allow for interactionist dualism, or reconciling a causal role for experience with the causal closure of the physical domain.
claimDavid Chalmers identifies interactionist dualism as a consequence of denying the causal closure of the physical, potentially through the invocation of wavefunction collapse in quantum mechanics.
claimInteractionist dualism is not incompatible with current physical theory.
claimInteractionist dualism can be interpreted as a type of Russellian view that identifies specific nodes in the causal network, such as 'psychon' or 'collapse' nodes, as the locations of experience.
Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com Springer Apr 1, 2024 3 facts
claimInteractionist dualism posits that phenomenal consciousness makes a difference to the physical world, albeit only indirectly.
claimInteractionist dualism does not predict or make likely any specific pattern of associations between fitness contingencies and the characters of different sensations, meaning it does not gain support from the observation of adaptive-seeming correlations.
claimIn Russellian panpsychism, macro-experiences can be considered adaptations either because they are constituted of micro-experiences with causal powers, or because they are emergent properties that exert downward causation on lower-level processes, similar to interactionist dualism.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 1 fact
claimThe modern mind-body problem originates from René Descartes’s interactionist ontological dualism and the mechanistic worldview of his time.