concept

intentionality

Facts (32)

Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press Dec 20, 2023 11 facts
claimFranz Brentano declared intentionality to be 'the mark of the mental,' or the defining feature of mental states.
claimContemporary philosophers often regard phenomenality, or 'what it's like'-ness, as an equally or more important mark of the mental than intentionality.
claimPhenomenality is often argued to be non-functional and non-structural, whereas intentionality is regarded as potentially structural because it consists of an 'aboutness' relation between consciousness and the world.
claimPhenomenal intentionality theories posit that intentionality can be fully explained in phenomenal terms, or a combination of phenomenal and physical terms, rather than solely in physical terms.
claimIntentionality is the property of consciousness where mental states, such as thoughts and intentions, are directed toward or about things or states in the world.
claimPhenomenal intentionality theories assert that the phenomenal qualities of a person's experience, including feelings of intention, will, and understanding, fully determine their intentional states, or determine them in conjunction with physical relations to the environment.
perspectiveJaegwon Kim (2005) and other non-physicalists argue that while intentionality might be physically explained, phenomenality cannot be.
claimThe intentionality of physical symbols, such as written text, is derivative because it depends on conscious beings deciding that those symbols represent something.
claimNon-physicalist theories generally agree that phenomenality is non-physical, and they view intentionality as being constituted by phenomenality, the physical, or a combination of both, or as a fundamental property alongside phenomenality.
claimNon-physicalism is supported by arguments regarding the epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, as well as arguments asserting that the intentionality and unity of consciousness cannot be accounted for physically.
referenceAttempts to 'naturalize' intentionality—accounting for it in physical terms—have been proposed by Ruth Millikan (1984), Fred Dretske (1988), and Jerry Fodor (1990) by focusing on the physical abilities of conscious beings to track objects or features in their environment.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jun 18, 2004 5 facts
referenceGalen Strawson published 'Real intentionality' in the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences in 2005.
referencePeter Carruthers (2000) asserts that nonconscious states can exhibit intentionality, necessitating an understanding of how the representational aspects of conscious states resemble and differ from those of nonconscious states.
claimImmanuel Kant (1787), Edmund Husserl (1913), and subsequent phenomenologists demonstrated that the phenomenal structure of experience is intentional and includes complex representations of time, space, cause, body, self, and the world.
perspectiveJohn Searle (1990) holds the perspective that only conscious states and dispositions to have conscious states can be genuinely intentional, a view that contrasts with the majority of theorists who regard intentionality as extending into the unconscious domain.
claimCharles Siewert (1998) suggests that phenomenal structure should be considered as involving a specific kind of intentional and representational organization distinctively associated with consciousness.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Howard Robinson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 19, 2003 5 facts
claimPhilosophical concepts related to the mind-body problem include behaviorism, consciousness, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, identity theory, intentionality, mental causation, neutral monism, and physicalism.
claimMental states are characterized by two primary properties: subjectivity (privileged access) and intentionality.
claimFranz Brentano raised problems concerning the irreducibility of intentionality, which are connected to debates about dualism.
claimIntentionality is the property of mental states being 'about' other things, including non-existent things like Zeus or the square root of minus one, which physical things cannot literally be.
claimMental properties, which include consciousness (such as perceptual and emotional experience) and intentionality (such as beliefs and desires), are private to the subject and involve a form of privileged access that no one else has to the physical.
Consciousness studies : cross-cultural perspectives - Internet Archive archive.org McFarland Jul 23, 2023 2 facts
referenceThe book 'Consciousness studies: cross-cultural perspectives' organizes Western traditions of consciousness into several key areas: primary awareness, paradoxical and pathological awareness, paranormal awareness, philosophical discussions on consciousness, mind and intentionality, the relationship between consciousness and the brain in physics, and various psychologies of consciousness.
referenceThe Western Tradition section of 'Consciousness studies: cross-cultural perspectives' covers topics including primary awareness, paradoxical and pathological awareness, paranormal awareness, philosophical discussions on consciousness, mind and intentionality, the relationship between consciousness and the brain, the new physics, and psychologies of consciousness.
Complexity and the Evolution of Consciousness | Biological Theory link.springer.com Springer Sep 14, 2022 2 facts
referenceGinsburg and Jablonka (2019) argue that unlimited associative learning (UAL) ties together eight features of consciousness: (1) global accessibility and broadcast, (2) binding/unification and differentiation, (3) selective attention and exclusion, (4) intentionality, (5) integration of information over time, (6) an evaluative system, (7) agency and embodiment, and (8) registration of a self/other distinction.
perspectiveWalter Veit argues that intentionality and consciousness should not be viewed as inherently connected, suggesting that one can be an eliminativist about one while remaining a realist about the other.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 facts
perspectiveDavid Chalmers notes that he is torn on the question of intentionality, finding both the phenomenological aspects and the potential for functional analyses of intentional contents compelling.
referenceIn his book, David Chalmers presents a neutral line on intentionality, noting that there is a 'deflationary' construal where even a zombie could have beliefs, and an 'inflationary' construal where true belief requires consciousness.
The development of consciousness from an evolutionary perspective academia.edu Academia.edu 1 fact
claimIntentionality in basic organisms enables them to track and react to objects, which evolved over time into complex representations that allow for adaptive behavior.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Capturing Christianity Dec 11, 2019 1 fact
claimArguments against physicalism include those based on intentionality (the 'aboutness' of thoughts), the 'unity of consciousness,' and the human ability to reason.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1 fact
claimProposals made in the 2020s suggest that a cognitively inspired form of representationalism can reconcile neuroscience and the philosophy of mind by bridging gaps regarding concepts such as intentionality, emergence, consciousness, and qualia.
The Mechanisms of Psychedelic Visionary Experiences - Frontiers frontiersin.org Frontiers Sep 27, 2017 1 fact
claimThe Hyperactive Agent-Detection Device (HADD) functions by attributing the intentionality of an agent as the fundamental cause of any phenomena.
Chapter 5 - Asian perspectives: Indian theories of mind cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 1 fact
claimThe Buddhist account of the mental involves a complex notion of intentionality with several possible meanings.