concept

immunity to error through misidentification

Also known as: IEM

Facts (24)

Sources

Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jul 13, 2017 24 facts

referenceSimon Prosser and François Recanati edited the book 'Immunity to Error Through Misidentification', published by Cambridge University Press in 2012.

claimWh-IEM (immunity to which-misidentification) and standard IEM (Immunity to Error through Misidentification) are distinct phenomena because it is possible to have judgments that are IEM but not wh-IEM, but the converse is not possible.

claimTimothy Lane and Caleb Liang argue that there is a relationship between self-consciousness and immunity to error through misidentification in their 2011 paper 'Self-Consciousness and Immunity'.

claimAn alternative formulation of IEM (Immunity to Error through Misidentification) defines a judgment 'a is F' as IEM if and only if it is impossible to undercut the evidence for judging 'a is F' without also undercutting the evidence that 'someone is F'.

claimThe specific grounds that give rise to first-person judgments that are IEM (Immunity to Error through Misidentification) are a contested matter in philosophy.

quoteCrispin Wright stated in 1998: "a claim made on a certain kind of ground involves immunity to error through misidentification just when its defeat is not consistent with retention of grounds for existential generalization."

claimFirst-person thoughts are defined as IEM (Immunity to Error through Misidentification) relative to grounds G if and only if it is impossible to know, via G, that some particular thing 'a' is 'F' and judge oneself to be 'F' by mistakenly believing 'a' is identical to oneself.

claimAnnalisa Coliva argues in her 2002 paper 'Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification' that the phenomenon of thought insertion relates to immunity to error through misidentification.

referenceCheryl K. Chen explored bodily awareness and immunity to error through misidentification in her 2011 paper 'Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error through Misidentification'.

claimEpistemic security, the philosophical position that one cannot be mistaken about whether one is in a certain mental state, is distinct from the immunity to error through misidentification described by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

referenceJordi Fernández authored 'Memory and Immunity to Error through Misidentification' in the journal 'Review of Philosophy and Psychology' in 2014.

claimThe sense of ownership is a candidate for explaining immunity to error through misidentification because if conscious experiences seem to be one's own, there is no need for identification of the experience's subject as oneself.

claimSydney Shoemaker formulated the concept of 'immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun' (IEM), defining an error of misidentification as occurring when one knows a particular thing 'a' to be 'F' and judges that 'b' is 'F' because one mistakenly believes 'a' is identical to 'b'.

referenceThe standard account of IEM (Immunity to Error through Misidentification) is supported by various philosophers including Shoemaker (1968, 1970, 1986, 2012), Brewer (1995), Bermúdez (1998), Peacocke (1999, 2008, 2014), Coliva (2006), Recanati (2007), Perry (2012), Prosser & Recanati (2012), and Musholt (2015).

claimLudwig Wittgenstein suggests that the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) is responsible for the mistaken opinion that the use of 'I' as a subject refers to an immaterial soul. Wittgenstein argues that self-ascriptions of psychological predicates do not rely on an identification of a bodily or non-bodily entity, but rather rely on no identification at all.

claimChristopher Peacocke questions whether modes of experience can act as the 'non-conceptual parent' of the first-person concept and phenomena like immunity to error through misidentification.

referenceFrançois Recanati authored the paper 'Immunity to Error Through Misidentification', published in the collection 'Prosser & Recanati 2012' in 2012.

referenceJames Pryor authored the paper 'Immunity to Error Through Misidentification', published in Philosophical Topics in 1999.

referenceJohn Campbell published 'Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term' in Philosophical Topics in 1999, volume 26, issues 1 and 2, pages 89–104.

claimThe concept of Immunity to Error through Misidentification (IEM) is explained by the architectural feature of self-tracking experiences, where it is impossible for a subject to know that a property 'F' applies to an object 'a' but mistakenly attribute it to themselves because they misidentify 'a' as themselves.

claimImmunity to Error through Misidentification (IEM) is relative to the grounds on which a judgment is based.

claimImmunity to error through misidentification (IEM) is not a feature that judgments possess solely in virtue of their content, but rather a feature that depends on the grounds for the judgment, such as perception, testimony, introspection, or memory.

claimPryor (1999) considers 'wh-IEM' (immunity to error through misidentification) to be a more fundamental notion than 'IEM' because 'a was F' entails 'someone was F,' and judgments based on identification are subject to errors of wh-misidentification.

claimLucy O'Brien discussed action and immunity to error through misidentification in her 2012 chapter 'Action and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification'.