Knowledge Tree
experiences
Facts (20)
Sources
Epistemic Justification – Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology press.rebus.community 5 facts
claimFoundationalists argue that basic beliefs are justified by experiences rather than by other beliefs.
claimExplanationism is a theory of epistemic justification which posits that justification is determined by which propositions provide the best explanations for a person's experiences.
perspectiveStrong foundationalists claim that the truth of basic beliefs is transparently evident within the experiences that elicit them.
claimExplanationism holds that a person is justified in believing a proposition if that proposition is part of the best explanation available to that person for their overall experiences.
claimUnlike pure coherentism, explanationism incorporates experiences into the constitution of justification, allowing experiences to serve as foundations that stop a regress of justification.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 4 facts
claimPhenomenalism posits that physical objects have the potential to produce experiences even when unperceived, which allows physical objects to exist stably and appear in a regular way when perceived.
claimSubjective idealism interprets the argument from physical causal closure not as evidence of physical events having sufficient physical causes, but as evidence of regularities holding between various kinds of perceptions or experiences.
claimSubjective idealism addresses unity arguments against physicalism by positing subjects as mental substances in addition to experiences or ideas.
claimEpiphenomenalism is argued to be self-undermining because the theory itself is a judgment about experiences, and if epiphenomenalism is true, that judgment lacks justification.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that a solution to the 'not-mental' problem requires a theory that justifies attributing proto-mentality based on the theory's indirect explanatory benefits regarding our own experiences.
claimDavid Chalmers asserts that regardless of the specific metaphysics proposed by Bilodeau, there remains a requirement for an explanatory theory that connects experiences to brain processes.
claimWarner argues that while many beliefs about experiences are mistaken, beliefs about experiences are incorrigible when the ability to recognize those experiences is "unimpaired."
claimDavid Chalmers proposes that experiences constitute some concepts of experience, and when a belief directs such a concept at the experience that constitutes it, the belief is incorrigible because the experience is "inside" the content of the belief.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
claimIn his 1974 paper 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?', philosopher Thomas Nagel argued that experiences are essentially subjective and accessible only to the individual undergoing them, whereas physical states are essentially objective and accessible to multiple individuals.
claimThomas Nagel argued that because experiences are subjective and physical states are objective, it is unclear what it means to claim that a felt state is identical to a functional state, making the concept of reductivism difficult to understand.
Understanding epistemology and its key approaches in research cefcambodia.com Jan 21, 2023 1 fact
claimInterpretivists believe that knowledge of the world depends on the interpretation or understanding of human actions, experiences, and environments.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 1 fact
claimExperiential foundationalism combines two crucial ideas: (i) when a justified belief is basic, its justification is not owed to any other belief; (ii) what in fact justifies basic beliefs are experiences.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimThe essence of a conscious subject's point of view includes not only the experiences they are currently having, but also the fact that they are having those specific experiences to the exclusion of all others.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 1 fact
referenceThe article "Experiences don’t sum" by Philip Goff was published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 2006, volume 13, issue 6, pages 53–61.
Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
claimNumerical identity is defined as a state where there is one single object responsible for multiple experiences, rather than two distinct objects.