Knowledge Tree
Doxastic Basicality
Also known as: DB
Facts (10)
Sources
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 9 facts
claimThe belief 'It appears to me that that hat is blue' serves as an example of a potentially basic belief under the Doxastic Basicality (DB) definition, provided it does not owe its justification to any other beliefs held by the subject.
claimDoxastic basicality is defined as a function of how a subject's belief system (doxastic system) is structured.
formulaDoxastic Basicality (DB) defines a subject's justified belief that p as basic if and only if the belief that p is justified without owing its justification to any of the subject's other beliefs.
claimThe 'compromise position' in epistemology is characterized by four features: it allows for doxastic basicality; it does not allow for epistemic basicality; it is inconsistent with doxastic coherentism; and it qualifies as a version of coherentism known as dependence coherentism.
claimEpistemic Basicality (EB) sets a stricter standard for a belief to be considered basic compared to the definition of basicality (DB).
claimA belief (H) can be considered 'basic' under Dogmatic Foundationalism (DB) if the justification for (H) is owed solely to a perceptual experience (E) and track-record memories (M), provided neither (E) nor (M) includes any beliefs.
claimThe regress argument, even if sound, only demonstrates the necessity of doxastic basicality, which dependence coherentism allows for, meaning the argument only effectively defends experiential foundationalism against doxastic coherentism.
claimExperiential foundationalists who prefer Experiential Foundationalism (EB) over Dogmatic Foundationalism (DB) cannot argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because the individual has a reason for believing they are, as that reason would constitute a belief, which contradicts the EB definition of basicality.
claimCoherentism denies the existence of basic beliefs, construing the theory either as the denial of doxastic basicality or the denial of epistemic basicality.
Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 1 fact
claimThe regress argument for foundationalism only demonstrates the necessity of doxastic basicality, which is compatible with dependence coherentism, rather than proving the necessity of independence foundationalism.