causal closure of the physical
Also known as: causal closure of the physical domain, causal closure of the physical
Facts (19)
Sources
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 13 facts
claimDavid Chalmers identifies two categories of alternatives to epiphenomenalism: denying the causal closure of the physical domain to allow for interactionist dualism, or reconciling a causal role for experience with the causal closure of the physical domain.
claimDavid Chalmers identifies interactionist dualism as a consequence of denying the causal closure of the physical, potentially through the invocation of wavefunction collapse in quantum mechanics.
claimDavid Chalmers suggests it may be possible to avoid epiphenomenalism while embracing the causal closure of the physical domain by adopting the correct view of the place of consciousness in the natural order.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers asserts that the causal closure of the physical domain should not be denied lightly.
claimLocating experience as the intrinsic property underlying physical dispositions allows experience to be placed inside the causal network described by physics without violating the causal closure of the physical.
claimDavid Hodgson and Henry Stapp appeal to quantum mechanics as a potential reason to deny the causal closure of the physical world.
claimDavid Chalmers believes that denying the causal closure of the physical domain does not solve the problems associated with epiphenomenalism.
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that if the physical domain is a closed causal network, one must choose between views that make experience epiphenomenal or views like Russellian monism, which posits that the intrinsic properties of matter are proto-experiential.
claimDavid Chalmers accepted the causal closure of the physical world in his paper to avoid the implications of denying it, rather than because he believes it is necessarily true.
claimDavid Chalmers notes that theories taking experience as irreducible must address whether to maintain the causal closure of the physical domain.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers prefers to remain neutral regarding the causal closure of the physical world to avoid conflating the irreducibility of consciousness with Cartesian dualism.
claimA common argument for denying the causal closure of the physical world is that physical explanations of functions must be incomplete if consciousness is to play a causal role.
referenceMills (1995) proposes a strategy to reconcile a causal role for experience with the causal closure of the physical by relying on causal overdetermination, though this view is criticized for retaining a fragmented and inelegant picture of nature.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
claimEpiphenomenalism is a dualistic approach that accepts the causal closure of physics by asserting that phenomenal properties have no causal influence on the physical world.
claimConsciousness epiphenomenalism is a view that accepts the causal closure of physics but maintains that phenomenal properties are metaphysically distinct from physical properties, asserting that while physical events can cause conscious properties, conscious properties cannot cause physical events.
claimA dualist view of consciousness exists that rejects the causal closure of physics while maintaining concordance with basic physical theory by assigning phenomenal properties the role of collapsing the wave function through observation.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimThe principle of the causal closure of the physical world asserts that for every physical event, there is a purely physical explanation for its occurrence that makes no reference to mental properties.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers and Philip Goff identify the need to account for mental causation within the causal closure of the physical—the thesis that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause—as a motivation for panpsychism.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 1 fact
claimThe thesis of causal closure of the physical asserts that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause.