concept

Aspect dualism

Also known as: Aspect dualism, aspect dualisms

Facts (10)

Sources

The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 10 facts

claimSpinoza’s pantheism, Leibniz’s monads, and the philosophy of Bertrand Russell are considered early examples of cosmological models that align with aspect dualism.

claimDavid Chalmers has referred to aspect dualism using various terms, including 'Type-F monism' (2002), 'Russellian monism' (2010), and 'property dualism' (1995).

claimAspect dualism suggests that the fundamental intrinsic essence of both mind and matter might be identical to phenomenal, mind-like properties, rather than matter-like properties such as spatiotemporal location, mass, energy, and causal determination.

claimOntological models are often categorized as 'monism' (including neutral monism, dual aspect monism, type-F monism, and Russell's monism) or 'dualism' (including aspect-dualism and naturalistic dualism) based on how they interpret properties as aspects or emergent ontic categories.

claimVon Stillfried proposes two options for understanding the involvement of consciousness: either physical and phenomenal properties are always intrinsically correlated (panpsychism), or the phenomenal is an intrinsic essence of the physical (Russellian monism/aspect dualism).

claimOntological models regarding the hard problem of consciousness can be classified into monist ontologies and dualisms, with monisms further divided into materialisms and idealisms, and dualisms into substance dualisms and aspect dualisms.

claimThe author defines 'monism' exclusively as eliminative monisms (referred to as 'negative approaches' by von Stillfried in 2018) and classifies all non-eliminative ontologies (von Stillfried's 'positive approaches') as types of dualism, specifically distinguishing between substance and aspect dualism.

claimRussellian monism can be interpreted as physicalism, aspect dualism, or idealism depending on the presumed relationship between inscrutables (the intrinsic properties of relata) and phenomenal properties.

claimAspect dualism and neutral monism are often used as synonymous terms to refer to David Chalmers’s Type-F monism.

claimAspect dualism suggests that mind and matter are not two different substances, but rather two aspects or properties of one universal principle or substance, which avoids the need for a causal mechanism to explain their correlation.