An argument for internalism based on the brain-in-the-vat scenario posits that because a subject (Tim*) is internally the same as a subject (Tim) but externally different, and their beliefs are justified in the same way, internal factors must be what justify beliefs.

Authors

• Person: Matthias Steup, Ram Neta Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Person: Not available Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition)

Sources

• Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper

Referenced by nodes (3)

• Brain-in-a-vat argument concept
• internalism concept
• Time entity