Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
cross_type 2.00 — strongly supporting 3 facts
David Chalmers discusses attention as a cognitive phenomenon that he distinguishes from the 'hard' problem of consciousness [1], while noting that attention itself may contain both functional and experiential aspects {fact:2, fact:3}.
Facts (3)
Sources
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 3 facts
claimDavid Chalmers notes that while Patricia Churchland correctly identifies that phenomena such as attention have an experiential component, it remains unclear why the experiential aspect should accompany the neural or cognitive functions associated with those phenomena.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that Patricia Churchland mischaracterizes his 'easy' versus 'hard' problem distinction by framing it as a division between specific cognitive problems like attention, learning, and memory on one hand, and the problem of consciousness on the other.
claimDavid Chalmers acknowledges that concepts like memory, attention, and consciousness may subsume elements of both functioning and subjective experience, meaning there are 'easy' and 'hard' aspects to each of these phenomena.