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cross_type 4.17 — strongly supporting 17 facts
David Chalmers is a central figure in the philosophy of mind who explicitly defines and analyzes the 'explanatory gap' as it relates to consciousness [1], [2]. He argues that this gap arises from the distinction between physical structure and phenomenal experience [3], [4], and he has extensively explored its implications in his academic work [5].
Facts (17)
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Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 13 facts
claimDavid Chalmers argues that the explanatory gap between physical facts and facts about consciousness is expected once fundamental psychophysical laws are introduced into our picture of nature.
claimDavid Chalmers notes that inter-level relationships like biochemistry/life and statistical mechanics/thermodynamics do not have an explanatory gap analogous to the brain-consciousness gap.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that the explanatory gap regarding consciousness is analogous to the explanatory gaps found in causal nexi, though humans are less accustomed to the former.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers agrees with Price's analogy regarding explanatory gaps but argues that it supports his own view of the problem of consciousness.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that the explanatory gap regarding consciousness should not be viewed as a unique mystery, but rather as a type of gap that is ubiquitous in science and fundamental physics.
claimDavid Chalmers explains that causal nexi have explanatory gaps because of their contingency, which stems from the brute contingency of fundamental laws.
claimDavid Chalmers posits that if Price's analogy is correct, the explanatory gap between the brain and consciousness arises from contingency in connecting principles caused by brutely contingent fundamental laws.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that Price's analogy between the brain-consciousness relation and ordinary causal relations helps demonstrate that believing in an explanatory gap does not necessitate adopting mysterianism.
claimDavid Chalmers asserts that explanatory gaps accompany every causal nexus, but humans are accustomed to these gaps in most cases.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that the explanatory gap regarding consciousness does not depend on ontological assumptions, but rather on the conceptual distinction between structural/functional concepts and consciousness.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that relationships like biochemistry/life and statistical mechanics/thermodynamics lack an explanatory gap because high-level facts are necessitated by low-level facts.
claimDavid Chalmers notes that the structural properties of experience, such as the geometry of a visual field, are more amenable to physical explanation than other phenomenal properties, yet still require a nonreductive principle to bridge the explanatory gap.
claimDavid Chalmers posits that moving from facts about physical structure and function to facts about conscious experience requires an extra step and a substantial principle to bridge the explanatory gap.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers refers to the difficulty of explaining consciousness as the 'hard problem of consciousness,' which is also known as the 'explanatory gap' or the 'generation problem'.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
referenceDavid Chalmers contributed the chapter 'Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap' to the book 'Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism', published by Oxford University Press in 2006.
David Chalmers - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues for an 'explanatory gap' from the objective to the subjective and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, identifying himself as a dualist.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers uses the concept of 'irreducibility' to define the explanatory gap between phenomenal experience (how it feels to be) and physical accounts of neuronal activity, cognition, and behavior.