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Relations (1)
cross_type 3.91 — strongly supporting 14 facts
David Chalmers integrates the concept of information into his philosophical framework by proposing it as a psychophysically neutral level of reality that explains both physical and phenomenal properties, as detailed in [1], [2], and [3]. He further explores this relationship by suggesting that information is phenomenally realized when physically realized, linking the structure of consciousness to informational states as described in [4], [5], and [6].
Facts (14)
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The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimDavid Chalmers posits that information must only be phenomenally realized if it is physically realized, meaning an information system must be active to possess qualia.
claimDavid Chalmers notes that the Double-Aspect Principle might need to be constrained so that only certain information is phenomenally realised, otherwise one must accept counterintuitive conclusions such as thermostats being minimally conscious.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers believes that information will invariably play a central role in any theory of consciousness, though he remains uncertain whether this role is conceptual or ontological.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimIn David Chalmers's formulation of panpsychism, information in any given position is phenomenally realized, while the informational state of the superposition as a whole is not.
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that information which is physically realized is simultaneously phenomenally realized, implying that both regularities in nature and conscious experience are expressions of information's underlying character.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers believes information plays an integral role in any theory of consciousness because the mind and brain possess corresponding informational structures.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
referenceDavid Chalmers' 1996 proposal on consciousness and information, as well as Giulio Tononi's integrated information theory (as described by Oizumi et al. 2014 and Tononi 2015), are examples of compositional dual-aspect models where the mental and physical are reducible to a neutral domain.
claimDavid Chalmers (1996) proposed that the underlying, psychophysically neutral level of description in dual-aspect theory could be characterized in terms of information.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
referenceDavid Chalmers' 1996 work on 'consciousness and information' classifies mental and physical properties as reducible to a psychophysically neutral domain.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers proposed a speculative version of panpsychism in 1996 that uses the concept of information to explain psycho-physical invariances and potentially derive the ontology of the physical from the informational.
The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems cambridge.org 1 fact
quoteDavid Chalmers asserts that claiming an explanation of how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported fails to explain 'how it is experienced' does not constitute a conceptual mistake.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers considers the possibility that all information has an experiential aspect, meaning that while not all information is realized in his consciousness, all information is realized in some consciousness.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
quoteDavid Chalmers suggested in his book 'The Conscious Mind' that the principles of phenomenal composition more closely reflect the constitution of information than the constitution of standard macrophysical structure.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers (1996) considers the possibility that the underlying, psychophysically neutral level of reality could be best characterized in terms of information.