Relations (1)
cross_type 2.81 — strongly supporting 6 facts
Immanuel Kant explores the nature of the [concept] 'self' by arguing that it is a formal condition for unifying experience [1], [2], and [3]. He further posits that the self is not an object of intuition [4] but functions as a necessary perspective within the intentional structure of consciousness [5], [6].
Facts (6)
Sources
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 3 facts
claimImmanuel Kant argues that there is no intuition of the self through which the self is given as an object.
claimAccording to Immanuel Kant, the representation of the self in the 'I think' is purely formal and is exhausted by its function in unifying experience.
claimImmanuel Kant argues that a subject must be able to comprehend their manifold representations in a single consciousness to call them their own, otherwise the self would be as diverse as the representations themselves.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 3 facts
claimImmanuel Kant (1787) and Edmund Husserl (1929) argued that the intentional coherence of the experiential domain relies on a dual interdependence between the self as a perspective and the world as an integrated structure of objects and events.
claimImmanuel Kant (1787) noted that the "I think" must at least potentially accompany every conscious experience, even if the self does not appear as an explicit element within that experience.
claimImmanuel Kant (1787), Edmund Husserl (1913), and subsequent phenomenologists demonstrated that the phenomenal structure of experience is intentional and includes complex representations of time, space, cause, body, self, and the world.