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related 3.00 — strongly supporting 7 facts
The 'hard problem of consciousness' is fundamentally defined by the problem of subjective experience, as established by David Chalmers in [1] and [2]. This relationship is further supported by the argument that functional explanations fail to account for why cognitive processes are accompanied by experience [3], [4], and the irreducibility of qualia within that experience [5].
Facts (7)
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The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 3 facts
claimDavid Chalmers's definition of the 'hard problem of consciousness' was not entirely new, as René Descartes followed a similar rationale, and Thomas Nagel (1974) had previously pointed to the irreducibility of experience, specifically regarding 'what it is like to be a bat'.
claimThe hard problem of consciousness includes the question of why specific qualia constitute experience, such as why seeing the color green feels exactly as it does in a specific moment or context.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that while the 'easy problems' of consciousness can be explained by specifying neural or computational mechanisms, the 'hard problem' remains because explaining cognitive and behavioral functions leaves an open question regarding why the performance of these functions is accompanied by experience.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers states that the 'unconscious mentality' problem—the question of how experience emerges from non-experience—applies to any view postulating proto-experiential properties at the fundamental level, though it is likely less difficult than the original 'hard problem' of consciousness.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
quoteDavid Chalmers stated in 1995: "What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?"
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimProponents of the hard problem argue that even after all functional facts are explained, a further question remains: 'why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?'
[PDF] Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers defines the 'hard problem' of consciousness as the problem of experience.