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Consciousness and experience are deeply linked in analytic philosophy, where consciousness is frequently defined as the presence of experience [1] or the 'feeling of what it is like to be' {fact:4, fact:5}. Many theorists treat the two as synonymous [2] or argue that experience is a fundamental phenomenon that any theory of consciousness must account for {fact:9, fact:10}.
Facts (13)
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Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers argues that prima facie, the phenomena a theory of consciousness must account for include both functions (such as discrimination, integration, and report) and experience, and that explaining experience is distinct from explaining these functions.
claimThe manifest phenomena that require explanation in the case of consciousness include discrimination, reportability, integration, and experience.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers suspects that any property enabling consciousness must be hidden because an empirically adequate theory can always be described in terms of structure and dynamics that are compatible with the absence of experience.
claimDavid Chalmers asserts that explanations like 'brain B yields experience E' or 'oscillations yield consciousness' are insufficient because they are too complex and macroscopic, requiring further explanation themselves.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimDavid Chalmers, Joseph Levine, and Saul Kripke argue that philosophical zombies are impossible within the bounds of nature but possible within the bounds of logic, implying that facts about experience are not logically entailed by physical facts and that consciousness is irreducible.
claimDavid Chalmers defines consciousness using Thomas Nagel's concept of 'the feeling of what it is like to be something,' treating consciousness as synonymous with experience.
perspectiveLinguist Anna Wierzbicka argues that the vocabulary used by consciousness researchers, such as "experience" and "consciousness," is "parochially English" and not universally translatable, suggesting that the hard problem would dissolve if philosophers used "panhuman concepts" like "know," "think," or "feel."
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 2 facts
Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences journal-psychoanalysis.eu 2 facts
claimRay Jackendoff argues that consciousness is irreducible and that insights into experience act as constraints for a computational theory of mind, yet he fails to provide specific methodological recommendations for studying consciousness.
claimThomas Nagel's expression 'what it is like to be' is widely accepted in the literature as capturing the essential nature of subjectivity, consciousness, qualia, and experience.
The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective frontiersin.org 1 fact
claimThe author defines "experience" as encompassing both minimal and complex contents of consciousness, including phenomenal, access, and extended forms of consciousness, regardless of whether they are realized in every stimulus situation.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimIn contemporary analytic philosophy, the dominant definition of consciousness is that an entity is conscious if there is something that it is like to be that entity, meaning it has some kind of experience, regardless of how basic that experience is.