Relations (1)

related 0.50 — strongly supporting 5 facts

The 'phenomenal powers view' is a specific theoretical perspective on 'consciousness', as it attributes intrinsic causal power to consciousness [1] and is supported by adaptive-seeming correlations [2], while facing criticisms like difficulties reconciling first-person data on pain [3] and major problems addressed by alternatives [4].

Facts (5)

Sources
Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com Springer 5 facts
claimThe associative learning explanation of consciousness does not attribute intrinsic causal power to consciousness to motivate behavior, unlike the phenomenal powers view proposed by Mørch.
perspectiveThe author asserts that the phenomenal powers view of consciousness has major problems and that an alternative explanation exists which avoids these issues.
perspectiveThe author argues that first-person data regarding the enjoyment of pain itself is difficult to reconcile with the phenomenal powers view of consciousness.
perspectiveThe sensational associative learning explanation is superior to the phenomenal powers view because it accounts for adaptive-seeming structural aspects of consciousness and explains why sensations have varying valences, such as clear valence in pain, little or no valence in green, or ambiguous valence in surprise.
claimThe author of the article argues that adaptive-seeming correlations provide strong support for the phenomenal powers view of consciousness.