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Mental states and physical states are central components of the mind-body problem, which examines their ontological distinction [1] and their potential causal interactions [2], [3]. Various philosophical frameworks, including property dualism [4], non-reductive physicalism [5], and materialism [6], define their relationship by debating whether these states are identical, distinct, or mutually influential.
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Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 4 facts
perspectiveMaterialist views assert that mental states are simply physical states, despite appearances to the contrary.
claimThe causal question within the mind-body problem asks whether physical states influence mental states, whether mental states influence physical states, and the mechanisms by which these influences occur.
claimThe mind-body problem is defined as the set of questions concerning the relationship between mental states and physical states.
claimThe ontological question within the mind-body problem asks whether mental states and physical states are distinct, or if one class is a subclass of the other.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 2 facts
claimNon-reductive physicalism occupies a middle ground between reductive physicalism, which claims mental states are identical to physical states, and dualism, which posits mental substances separate from physical reality.
claimDownward causation is the theory that mental states can causally influence physical states without violating physical laws.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 2 facts
claimOverdetermination dualism is compatible with physical causal closure, similar to epiphenomenalism, but differs by allowing mental states to affect physical states.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, such as physicalism and interactionism, face the same improbability issues as epiphenomenalism because they must posit specific two-way psychophysical laws or identity relations to explain correlations between physical and mental states.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com 1 fact
claimProperty dualism claims that at least some mental states are not reducible to physical states, meaning conscious beings instantiate two radically different kinds of properties—mental and physical—neither of which is reducible to the other.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
accountOccasionalism and parallelistic views, such as those proposed by Leibniz or Spinoza, utilized a Divine principle to explain the correlation between mental and physical states to avoid the need for a naturalistic explanation.