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related 4.64 — strongly supporting 24 facts
Computational functionalism is a philosophical theory that posits consciousness is determined by, or equivalent to, specific computational processes {fact:1, fact:6, fact:24}. This relationship is defined by the claim that consciousness is substrate-independent and can be realized through information processing regardless of the physical medium {fact:9, fact:20, fact:12}.
Facts (24)
Sources
AI Sessions #9: The Case Against AI Consciousness (with Anil Seth) conspicuouscognition.com 12 facts
perspectiveAnil Seth disputes the notion that computational functionalism is the only valid framework for understanding consciousness, noting that the term 'information processing' is frequently used to describe the brain without a clear, rigorous definition.
claimHenry Shevlin argues that if consciousness is computational, it must be substrate-invariant, similar to how games like poker or chess, and money, remain the same regardless of the medium (coins, banknotes, or digital balance sheets).
perspectiveAnil Seth defines computational functionalism as the assumption that consciousness is fundamentally a matter of computation, which is independent of the specific material implementing that computation.
claimComputational functionalism is the view that consciousness is defined by the information processing performed by a system, and that if this computational description is abstracted and implemented in a different medium, it retains the properties of the original biological brain.
referenceComputational functionalism is defined as the view that consciousness is equivalent to computation and is substrate-independent.
perspectiveAnil Seth argues that if one believes simulating biological details is necessary for consciousness, it undermines the claim that consciousness is constitutively computational, because if consciousness were purely computational, those specific biological details should be irrelevant.
claimComputational functionalism is under pressure because it relies on the assumption that consciousness is sufficiently describable by a computation, which may not account for non-algorithmic brain functions.
perspectiveAnil Seth argues that simulating biological details, such as mitochondria or microtubules, in a digital computer does not make the simulation conscious unless consciousness is constitutively computational.
claimAnil Seth posits that if specific biological aspects are proven necessary for consciousness, then the theory of computational functionalism cannot be true.
claimHenry Shevlin asserts that while computational functionalism is one path to concluding that AI can be conscious, there are other types of functionalism that also support this conclusion.
claimAnil Seth argues that if computational functionalism is true, silicon is a viable candidate for consciousness because it is effective at implementing Turing computations.
claimAnil Seth asserts that the burden of proof lies with computational functionalists to explain why computation is sufficient for consciousness, given the physical differences between computers and brains.
Consciousness and AI - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu 2 facts
claimComputational functionalism is often motivated by explanations of consciousness that define it in terms of broad functional features of the brain, such as gating mechanisms that select information for further distribution and processing.
perspectiveComputational functionalism claims that implementing computations of the right kind is sufficient for consciousness.
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying ... arxiv.org 2 facts
claimComputational functionalism is the thesis that some set of computable input-output mappings is sufficient for consciousness.
claimObjections to computational functionalism challenge premises like multiple realizability and medium independence, sometimes arguing that consciousness requires a biological or fundamental substrate.
In defense of scientifically and philosophically (not politically ... blog.apaonline.org 2 facts
claimCritics of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) argue that the theory incorrectly predicts that an inactive grid of connected logic gates could be conscious, even if it performs no useful computations.
claimCritics of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) argue that useful computations are necessary for consciousness, which aligns with the philosophy of mind known as computational functionalism (citing Koch 2019).
The Functionalist Case for Machine Consciousness: Evidence from ... lesswrong.com 2 facts
claimComputational functionalism is defined by the authors of 'Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for ...' as the view that consciousness is determined by computational organization.
claimMany rationalists display a tension in their philosophical views by embracing computational functionalism while simultaneously maintaining deep skepticism about the possibility of consciousness in artificial systems.
[PDF] The Behavioral Inference Principle for Machine Consciousness charleywu.github.io 1 fact
claimAccording to the theory of computational functionalism, an artificial system achieves consciousness when it attains computational equivalence.
Machine Consciousness Hypothesis cimc.ai 1 fact
claimComputationalist functionalism does not inherently imply that current computers are conscious, nor does it imply that machine consciousness can be achieved.
The Evidence for AI Consciousness, Today - AI Frontiers ai-frontiers.org 1 fact
claimThe field of AI research increasingly favors computational functionalist theories regarding consciousness, though there is no consensus on which specific theory is correct or which evidence is most compelling.
Unknown source 1 fact
claimAccording to the theory of computational functionalism, consciousness in artificial intelligence systems built on conventional hardware is possible in principle, provided that certain unspecified assumptions are met.