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• David Chalmers clarifies that he does not believe understanding the 'easy problems' of consciousness or neurobiological accounts are useless for addressing the 'hard problem'; rather, he asserts that such accounts are incomplete on their own and require something more for a full solution.
• E.J. Lowe and David Hodgson argue that the 'easy' problems of consciousness, such as explaining discrimination and reportability, are as difficult as the 'hard' problem of consciousness.
• David Chalmers argues that Patricia Churchland mischaracterizes his 'easy' versus 'hard' problem distinction by framing it as a division between specific cognitive problems like attention, learning, and memory on one hand, and the problem of consciousness on the other.
• David Chalmers argues that thinkers often conflate psychological and phenomenal consciousness, claiming to have solved the 'hard problem of consciousness' when they have actually only solved certain 'easy problems of consciousness'.
• David Chalmers asserts that the 'hard problem' of consciousness is irreducible to the 'easy problems' because the easy problems pertain to the causal structure of the world, whereas facts about consciousness include information that goes beyond mere causal or structural description.
• David Chalmers authored a paper that distinguishes between the 'Easy Problems' and the 'Hard Problem' of consciousness.
• “There is nevertheless one behavioural function that has an especially close tie to the hard problem. This behavioural function involves phenomenal reports: the things we say about consciousness (that is, about phenomenal consciousness). More specifically, many people make problem reports expressing our sense that consciousness poses a hard problem. I say things like ‘There is a hard problem of consciousness’, ‘It is hard to see how consciousness could be physical’, ‘Explaining behaviour does not explain consciousness’, and so on. ... The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a second approximation) the problem of explaining these problem reports. Problem reports are a fact of human behaviour. Because of this, the meta-problem of explaining them is strictly speaking one of the easy problems of consciousness. Although the meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, it is deeply connected to the hard problem. We can reasonably hope that a solution to the meta-problem will shed significant light on the hard problem”
• David Chalmers defines the 'easy problems' of consciousness as mechanistic explanations involving the activity of the nervous system and brain in relation to the environment, while defining the 'hard problem' as the question of why those physical mechanisms are accompanied by subjective feelings, such as the feeling of pain.
• Proponents of the hard problem argue that it is categorically different from easy problems because no mechanistic or behavioral explanation can account for the character of subjective experience, even in principle.
• The book 'The Conscious Mind' has significantly influenced the philosophy of mind and the scientific study of consciousness, establishing David Chalmers' distinction between the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness as standard terminology.
• David Chalmers criticizes Patricia Churchland for failing to address the central arguments presented in his keynote paper and for not providing a systematic difference between the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness.
• David Chalmers distinguishes between 'easy' problems of consciousness, such as explaining object discrimination or verbal reports, and the 'hard problem' of consciousness, which he defines as the question: 'why does the feeling which accompanies awareness of sensory information exist at all?'
• The authors propose a quantum theory of consciousness (QTOC) based on a new interpretation of quantum physics, asserting that it can address both the hard and easy problems of consciousness as well as other unsolved problems in neuroscience.
• David Chalmers paraphrases Immanuel Kant to describe the relationship between the hard and easy problems of consciousness: 'hard without easy is empty; easy without hard is blind.'
• David Chalmers categorizes the problems of consciousness into two distinct types: the 'easy problems' and the 'hard problem'.
• David Chalmers contrasts the 'hard problem of consciousness' with 'easy problems' of consciousness, which include discriminating between environmental stimuli, integrating information, and reporting on mental states.
• David Chalmers defines the distinction between the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness as the difference between explaining how functions are performed and explaining subjective experience.
• David Chalmers asserts that the 'easy' problems of consciousness are clearly problems of explaining how functions are performed, whereas the 'hard' problem is not.
• David Chalmers claims that even if 'easy' and 'hard' phenomena are aspects of the same thing, as Bernard Baars suggests, a further principle is required to explain the connection between them.
• David Chalmers distinguishes between the 'easy problem' and the 'hard problem' of consciousness, a conceptual framework he inherited from René Descartes.
• David Chalmers believes that an adequate theory of consciousness requires solving both the hard and easy problems, meaning science must discover not only brain states associated with conscious experience but also why and how those brain states are accompanied by experience.
• David Chalmers distinguishes between the 'easy problems' of consciousness, which involve functions like focusing attention, responding to stimuli, and recalling memories, and the 'hard problem,' which asks why these processes feel like something to the subject.
• David Chalmers argues that while the 'easy problems' of consciousness can be explained by specifying neural or computational mechanisms, the 'hard problem' remains because explaining cognitive and behavioral functions leaves an open question regarding why the performance of these functions is accompanied by experience.
• Warner and Lowe suggest that reportability, which David Chalmers classifies as an "easy" problem of consciousness, cannot be physically explained.
• David Chalmers maintains that the distinction between the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness is a conceptual distinction, not a claim that the two are unrelated.
• David Chalmers observes that researchers working on the easy problems of consciousness already outnumber those working on the hard problem by at least a hundred to one.
• David Chalmers asserts that standard reductive methods of neuroscience and cognitive science, which are effective for solving the 'easy problems' of consciousness, are insufficient for addressing the 'hard problem'.
• David Chalmers argues that the essential difference between the 'easy' problems of consciousness and the 'hard' problem is that the easy problems are theoretically answerable via physicalism, the dominant strategy in the philosophy of mind.
• Daniel Dennett and Patricia Churchland argue that the 'hard problem' of consciousness is best understood as a collection of 'easy problems' that will be resolved through further analysis of brain function and behavior.
• David Chalmers classifies Patricia Churchland as a 'type-A materialist' because she suggests there is no principled difference between the 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness.