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Relations (1)
related 3.17 — strongly supporting 8 facts
Belief is categorized as a specific type of mental state [1], and various epistemological theories define the justification of a belief through its relationship to other mental states {fact:2, fact:3, fact:4, fact:7, fact:8}. Furthermore, scholars like Keith Frankish argue that the term 'belief' refers to distinct types of mental states [2].
Facts (8)
Sources
Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
claimBelief is a mental state, and belief-formation is a mental process.
claimIn internalism, a belief is considered justified only if it is appropriately based upon or supported by other mental states.
claimAccording to internalism, the only factors relevant to determining whether a belief is justified are the believer's other mental states, such as beliefs about the world, sensory inputs, and beliefs about the relations between various beliefs.
What Is Epistemology? Pt. 3: The Nature of Justification and Belief philosimplicity.com 2 facts
claimInternalism is a theory of justification which posits that everything required to justify a belief is accessible to a person within their own mind, such as mental states or sensory inputs.
claimThe Internal-External (IE) debate is a major contemporary debate in epistemology concerning whether justification for beliefs comes from internal mental states or external conditions.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimExperiential foundationalism asserts that a belief is justified by a mental state that is not a belief, specifically the perceptual experience that the belief is about.
Research - Keith Frankish keithfrankish.com 1 fact
claimKeith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which possess different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation.
Epistemic Justification – Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology press.rebus.community 1 fact
claimExternalists claim that whether a person with a particular set of mental states justifiably believes a proposition p is contingent on factors external to the person's mind, meaning two people with identical mental states could differ in the justification of their beliefs.