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The hard problem of consciousness is fundamentally defined by the challenge of explaining why and how physical processes give rise to qualia, as established in [1], [2], and [3]. Proponents of the hard problem argue that qualia are intrinsic and ineffable, creating an explanatory gap that resists functional characterization [4], [5], and [6].
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A harder problem of consciousness: reflections on a 50-year quest ... frontiersin.org 3 facts
perspectiveThe author argues that the Hard Problem of Consciousness may be framed on questionable grounds because it overlooks mysteries that arise prior to the explanatory gap known as the alchemy of qualia.
claimThe author defines the 'Harder Problem of Consciousness' as the effort to explain space and time in order to securely position the elements needed to describe the Hard Problem of Consciousness, which is characterized as the alchemy of qualia.
claimDavid Chalmers coined the term 'Hard Problem of Consciousness' in 1995 to describe the question of why and how humans and other organisms possess qualia.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimThe hard problem of consciousness is a concept in the philosophy of mind that seeks to explain why and how humans and other organisms possess qualia.
quoteDehaene stated: "Once our intuitions are educated by cognitive neuroscience and computer simulations, Chalmers' hard problem will evaporate. The hypothetical concept of qualia, pure mental experience, detached from any information-processing role, will be viewed as a peculiar idea of the prescientific era, much like vitalism... [Just as science dispatched vitalism] the science of consciousness will keep eating away at the hard problem of consciousness until it vanishes."
perspectiveWolfgang Fasching argues that the hard problem of consciousness is not about qualia, but about the 'what-it-is-like-ness' of experience in Thomas Nagel's sense, specifically the givenness of phenomenal contents.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 3 facts
claimThe hard problem of consciousness includes the question of why specific qualia constitute experience, such as why seeing the color green feels exactly as it does in a specific moment or context.
claimThe 'hard problem of consciousness' refers to the question of why neurophysical processes are correlated with qualitative experience (qualia), or the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, and how this correlation can be explained.
claimAny proposed solution to the hard problem of consciousness should ideally provide answers to the nature of psychophysical correlation, the existence of the physical world, and the specific quality of qualia, which would also amount to a fundamental theory of mind and matter.
What is hard about the “hard problem of consciousness”? philosophy.stackexchange.com 2 facts
claimProponents of the 'hard problem' of consciousness argue that qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and private, which creates an unbridgeable 'explanatory gap' between physical knowledge and the subjective experience of having qualia.
claimProponents of the 'hard problem' of consciousness claim that explaining how the physics of the brain gives rise to qualia is a significantly harder problem than explaining the physics of the brain itself.
(DOC) The hard problem of consciousness & the phenomenological ... academia.edu 1 fact
claimThe 'hard problem' of consciousness may be explained as a qualia/qualia gap between specific sense qualia and neutral thought qualia, rather than a qualia/concept gap, because all physical concepts are linked to neutral thought qualia.
[PDF] The Hard Problem of Consciousness & The Progressivism of ... fds.duke.edu 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers defines phenomenal consciousness as 'the hard problem' because qualia resists functional characterization.
David Chalmers on the Hard Problem of Consciousness : r/philosophy reddit.com 1 fact
claimThe thought exercise discussed in the context of David Chalmers' work on the Hard Problem of Consciousness is designed to demonstrate that individuals could, in theory, behave like humans without possessing the qualia of consciousness.