Relations (1)

related 2.00 — strongly supporting 3 facts

The relationship is defined by the debate over whether the special sciences are reducible to physics, with [1] noting that special sciences are distinct from physics due to their lack of consistent constitutive structure, [2] contrasting their objectivity with that of physics, and [3] exploring the ontological implications of a potential reduction to basic physics.

Facts (3)

Sources
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Howard Robinson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3 facts
claimThe argument from predicate dualism to property dualism asserts that irreducible special sciences are not wholly objective like physics because they depend on interest-relative perspectives on the world.
claimIf the special sciences were reducible to basic physics, their ontologies could be understood from the bottom up as expressions of the physical rather than as interpretations.
claimTerms in special sciences (sciences other than physics) are generally not reducible to physical predicates because phenomena like hurricanes, infectious diseases, currency devaluations, or coups d'etat lack a consistent constitutive structure.